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SUMMARY 
The assay of nuclear fuel has become a topic of current interest 
with the increasing use of nuclear fission to generate electric power 
and the possibility of plutonium fuel cycles being used in fission reac-
tors. In this dissertation, a method of analyzing nuclear material for 
different fissile nuclides is proposed and an experiment is described 
that has tested the method for analysis of uranium-235 and plutonium-239, 
alone and in combination. 
The method of analysis is based on the differences in the abund-
ances and half-lives of delayed neutron groups between the various 
fissile nuclides. Laplace transforms are used to show that the steady 
state response to a cyclic activation is independent of activation cycle 
period at short periods, decreases exponentially with period at long 
periods, and has a break point, or knee, where the response changes from 
constant to exponential at a specific period that is a function of the 
half-life of the characteristic emitters. When more than one half-life 
is present in the response, as in the case of fissile nuclides which have 
six or more delayed neutron groups, the total response is the superposi-
tion of the responses resulting from each different half-life, and has 
a break point for each half-life in the response. 
In the experiment cyclic activation was accomplished by moving 
the samples containing fissile material cyclically through a thermal neu-
tron beam from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, out of the beam and 
through a delayed neutron detector, back through the beam, etc. The 
X 
delayed neutron response was recorded at activation cycle periods ranging 
from 0.1 to 100 seconds for samples containing varying amounts of uranium-
235 and plutonium-239. Deviations in the responses of the samples con-
taining both uranium-235 and plutonium-239 from the response of standards 
containing only uranium-235 or plutonium-239 were determined to infer the 
uranium-235 to plutonium-239 ratio. After the ratio of the two fissile 
nuclides present was obtained, the delayed neutron response at short cycle 
periods was used to estimate the mass of each fissile nuclide present in 
the sample. 
For samples containing about one gram of fissile material, accura-
cies of one percent were obtained for uranium-235 and five percent for 
plutonium-239 when the fissile nuclides were present in about equal por-
tions o Accuracies were dependent on uranium-235 to plutonium-239 ratio 
and on total mass of fissile material present. 
The data taken for the assay experiment were also used to look 
for the existence of any delayed neutron group with a half-life shorter 
than about 0.2 second. No delayed neutron groups were found with half-




To meet the world's energy needs for the next fifty years, heavy 
reliance must be placed on nuclear power. By 1980 the United States may 
depend on nuclear fission for the production of 15 percent of its electric-
ity. This figure may be as high as 25 percent by the year 2000. To sup-
port this nuclear-electric generating capability increasingly large amounts 
of fissionable materials must be produced, handled, and accounted for in 
the next few years. The commercial and intrinsic value of these materials, 
plutonium, uranium-233, and enriched uranium, insures that vendors and 
consumers will desire an accurate accounting of each transaction. In 
addition, the toxicity of these materials, particularly plutonium, and the 
potential for creating nuclear explosives with relatively small quantities 
of some fissionable materials has motivated the development of a nuclear 
safeguards system by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its counter-
parts in other countries that are developing or using nuclear generating 
facilities. "Safeguards" is a collective term that comprises those mea-
sures designed to guard against the diversion of materials such as source 
j-
and special nuclear materials from uses permitted by law or treaty, and 
•&• 
Source materials are uranium containing the mixture of isotopes 
occurring in nature, uranium depleted in the isotope 235, or thorium, or 
i i i " • i -i -i " i 
ores containing these materials; and special nuclear materials are plu-
tonium or uranium enriched in the isotopes 233 or 235. 
2 
to give timely indication of possible diversion, or credible assurance 
2 
that no diversion has occurred. 
The monetary values of plutonium-239, reactor grade plutonium, and 
uranium-235 are compared to values of some other materials in Table 1. 
Some materials have required the development of extensive systems of 
control and accountability for purely economic reasons. Materials con-
sidered hazardous, such as narcotics and alcohol, are usually tightly 
controlled whether or not such control is warranted by their value. In 
exchanges of gold or other precious metals, both parties require accurate 
determination of mass and purity because a large amount of money can be 
involved in small shipper-receiver discrepancies. Transactions involving 
valuable nuclear materials involve similar financial considerations. In 
addition, the composition of fuel is important in planning the operation 
of a reactor. Fuel element worth and total heat value of the fuel are 
important parameters for determining fuel element placement in reactor 
cores and predicting the frequency of reactor shutdown for removing spent 
fuel. When spent fuel is returned to the processor, both the fuel user 
and processor need an accurate analysis to determine the credit due the 
fuel user. The processor also needs to know the isotopic content of the 
returned material for efficient handling, such as proper planning of 
separative work for enrichment from mixed feed. Not only are fissionable 
materials toxic, nuclear explosives can be constructed from plutonium, 
3 
uranium-235 and -233 metal, and oxides of these materials. In fact, only 
5 to 10 kilograms of plutonium-239 or 20 to 30 kilograms of uranium-235 
4 
are necessary to construct an explosive. This is a very small percentage 











of the total amount of fissionable material that will be handled in the 
United States or other countries with nuclear power programs. Explosives 
can be made with plutonium having any of the various isotopic compositions 
contemplated for nuclear reactors. To make weapons of predictable yield, 
the concentration of plutonium-240, which decays by spontaneous fission, 
must be kept low. Plutonium generated in fast breeder reactors is suit-
able for high quality nuclear explosives because it contains low percentages 
* u • 2 4 0 T , , 242„ 35 TT . 
of the isotopes Pu and Pu. Weapons-grade uranium is usually con-
sidered to be enriched in uranium-235 or uranium-233 by 90 percent. However, 
explosives can be made from uranium enriched to as little as 20 or 30 
4 
percent. While HTGR and fast breeders are fueled with uranium of weapons 
grade, the slightly enriched fuel used in commercial light water reactors 
can not be fabricated into explosives. Light water reactor fuel is not 
without military importance, though, since much of the separative work 
required to produce weapons-grade uranium has already been accomplished 
in enriching uranium for reactor fuel. An enrichment plant can produce 
considerably more 90 percent enriched uranium using low enrichment reactor 
fuel instead of natural uranium as feed material. 
Safeguard procedures have been, and are being, developed to detect 
and prevent the diversion or accidental loss of special nuclear materials. 
Diversions may be attempted on scales ranging from a single employee steal-
ing valuable material from his employer to conspiracies involving national 
governments removing nuclear material from an internationally sponsored 
peaceful program to produce nuclear weapons. To stem the spread of nuc-
lear weapons and the concomitant threat of nuclear war, nations that have 
not developed fission explosives may agree not to do so with the 
understanding that their neighbors, also NPT signers, will also forego 
nuclear arms. The International Atomic Energy Agency must assure all the 
signers that none of the signers are producing weapons from special nuc-
lear materials diverted from peaceful atomic energy programs. 
Accountability is an important part of nuclear safeguards. Ac-
countability is that part of safeguards and materials management which 
encompasses the measurement system, records and reports to account for 
2 
source and special nuclear material. To meet accountability requirements, 
such as Part 70, Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, IAEA standards, 
and for their own economic reasons, users and processors of source and 
special nuclear materials rely on the various assay methods discussed 
in Chapter II to evaluate their inventories of nuclear materials and the 
quantities of these materials transferred between different processing 
stages or different companies. The ability of a nuclear material handler 
to account for his inventories and control transfers of materials depends 
upon the accuracy of the assay methods available to him and on the applic-
ability of these methods to each situation. The most precise methods are 
destructive to the sample assayed and take a relatively long time to ac-
complish. Care must be taken, when using a destructive method of analysis, 
to obtain samples that are representative of the entire quantity of mater-
ial to which the results of the assay are applied. Non-destructive assay 
(NDA) methods are generally not as precise as destructive methods for a 
single sample; however, results are sometimes more accurate because samp-
ling problems are often not as difficult. The statistical uncertainties 
associated with most NDA methods decrease with increased sample size or 
number of samples and, since non-destructive methods leave the assayed 
material intact and reusable, larger sample bases are available. When-
ever results are required on a short time scale, for instance in process 
control decisions, NDA methods are generally faster. In some cases, such 
as assembled fuel rods, NDA is the only acceptable method of analysis. 
Special nuclear materials, materials containing more than the na-
tural abundance of uranium-235 or containing uranium-233 or plutonium-
239, and source materials, materials containing more than 0.05 percent 
uranium or thorium, differ in their values per unit weight, the risk of 
diversions, and their assay requirements at different stages in the nu-
clear fuel cycle. In the mining and milling operations uranium and 
thorium-containing materials have relatively low specific dollar value, 
and risk of theft is fairly low. Uranium ore contains uranium in concen-
trations of only a few kilograms per metric tonne. After the ore is con-
centrated by physical and chemical means to yellow cake, i.e., Na„U„07, it 
has a content of elemental uranium of up to about 85 percent by weight, of 
which uranium-235 is present as about 0.71 atomic percent of the elemental 
uranium. Yellow cake is converted to uranium hexafluoride for enrichment 
in the isotope uranium-235 or as a convenient starting material for pro-
ducing uranium metal or UO,,. Assays for uranium are used at these stages 
for determining ore value, for process control, etc. 
In the enrichment process, isotopic assay for uranium-235 uranium-
238 ratios at various stages of the process is important for predicting an 
controlling plant operation. Currently no enrichment plant operation is 
7 
subject to IAEA safeguards because the existing plants are owned and 
operated by countries that already have nuclear weapons. In the future 
with increasing commercial use of nuclear materials, international safe-
guards as well as domestic safeguards and process control will require 
assay of all material in enrichment plants. The character of the enrich-
ment process makes accurate inventory-taking difficult. The process 
equipment used in diffusion plants has large surfaces exposed to corro-
sive UF, . Pumps and other rotating machinery with moving metal surfaces 
b 
and gas seals are used to maintain gas pressure and flow through a dif-
fusion plant or to supply the separative force in a centrifugal process. 
The UF^ can react with metal surfaces to produce solid corrosion products 
rich in uranium. Leakage of UFA through seals can allow significant 
6 
amounts of uranium to escape from inventory. The uranium lost from mea-
surable inventory is recoverable, to some extent, only when a process com-
ponent or stage is removed from service and cleaned. Engineering data 
necessary for making a good estimate of process inventory are not available 
in a new plant until routine equipment replacement and cleaning has begun. 
New plants require many months to reach operational equilibrium. Uranium 
takes about two months to traverse a diffusion plant and is contained in 
many operational diffusion stages. Temperature, pressure, and the iso-
topic character of the UF,- must be determined simultaneously at all parts 
of the operating system before a meaningful inventory can be taken. 
At the fuel fabrication facility uranium hexafluoride is converted 
to uranium oxide and pressed into pellets to be loaded into fuel rods. 
The materials presently handled in fuel fabrication plants for commercial 
8 
water-cooled reactors are low-enrichment uranium and natural uranium. 
Only small quantities of highly enriched uranium and plutonium are currently 
being processed. However, this situation may be changing. Plutonium-
bearing fuels will probably be recycled for use in light water reactors 
and large quantities of plutonium may be fabricated into fuel for breeder 
reactors. Substantial quantities of highly enriched uranium fuel will be 
needed for high temperature gas-cooled reactors. Fuel fabrication is an 
area of particular concern for safeguards considerations. At this stage 
the fuel is clean, containing no radioactivity other than its own, which 
is of low intensity, and it is usually in solid form and easily transport-
able. Preparation of metal creates refractory slags of uncertain compos-
ition and conversion of fluorides to oxides creates dilute liquid waste 
and powdered residues containing some actinides. These are difficult to 
measure accurately and precisely. The oxides of uranium, or plutonium 
in the case of recycled fuel, are compacted and fired into briquettes and 
then sized by grinding before loading into fuel rods. The high quality 
standard of process control required for reactor fuel results in substan-
tial quantities of reject material, scrap, and dust. 
At the reactor fissionable materials are handled as fresh fuel, 
fuel inside the reactor, spent fuel being stored, and cooled spent fuel 
being shipped to reprocessing. The reactor operator needs a non-destructive 
assay method to verify the fuel fabricator's statements about the contents 
of the fuel. Modern power reactors may use several values of enrichment 
at one time, even in a single fuel element. During the life of a fuel 
element the burnup of uranium-235 and production of plutonium-239 are 
9 
determined by the neutron flux level and energy spectrum the fuel element 
receives and by the flux history as well as the starting isotopic composi-
tion of the fuel elements. In the reactor, physical control over the 
nuclear material is simple; it is in containers that can be labeled and 
counted. But estimation of the isotopic make-up of the material in the 
containers requires detailed knowledge of the history of the fuel element 
in the operating reactor. Measurement of the fissionable material in 
spent reactor fuel is complicated by the intense gamma-ray emissions from 
included fission products. Spent fuel from a light-water reactor fueled 
with low-enrichment uranium typically contains about 0.7 percent uranium-
235 and one percent plutonium-239. 
Shipment of spent fuel from the user to the reprocessor is compli-
cated by the large gamma-ray background generated by the fission products 
present. Safe transportation requires heavy gamma-ray shielding and 
usually requires a 60-90 day cooling-off period before shipping. The 
difficulties in handling spent fuel in locations other than specially 
designed facilities limit the risk of diversion of nuclear materials in 
transit between the user and reprocessor. Since the fuel elements are 
not accessible or modified in transit, accountability obligations may be 
met by ensuring that the fuel shipments which leave the user arrive at the 
reprocessor intact. 
The fuel reprocessor will receive spent fuel assemblies from the 
reactor operator, cut them up, and chemically remove the uranium and plu-
tonium. Plutonium may then be recycled to the fuel rod fabricator and 
uranium that has not been depleted below the level of natural uranium can 
10 
be returned in the form of UF. as feed to an enrichment plant. Fuel 
discharged from natural uranium-fueled reactors and some reactors fueled 
with low-enrichment uranium may be depleted in uranium-235 below 0.2 or 
0.3 percent, the level of the tails from an enrichment plant, and would 
not be useful for enrichment. 
There is a fiscal accounting link between the reactor operator and 
fuel reprocessor in addition to their legal accountability obligations. 
The operator knows that his spent fuel contains plutonium and, possibly, 
recoverable quantities of uranium-235. The reprocessor will pay him for 
it, but uncertainty in individual input measurements currently ranges from 
one to five percent. 
Reprocessing is a difficult task. Oxide fuel is refractory and 
difficult to dissolve, and the presence of fission products requires that 
the entire process be done remotely. HTGR discharge fuel will be even 
more difficult to handle, it consists of small beads of uranium or thorium 
carbide, difficult to dissolve in itself, coated with silicon carbide and 
pyrolytic carbon. The material will be burned to remove the carbon and 
ground to burst the spheres before chemical dissolution is attempted. 
Chemical assay of spent HTGR fuel is difficult for the reasons reprocessing 
is difficult. Assay for total uranium and plutonium of a few cubic centi-
meters is costly and takes several days to get the results. 
After the spent fuel is cut up and dissolved, the process produces 
streams in which fissionable material is not easily measured. The streams 
are not readily sampled and destructive assaying is costly and results in 
dissipation of material. In the reprocessing plant, material unaccounted 
11 
for (MUF) often resides in the equipment as precipitates and corrosion 
products, complicating the task of meeting accountability requirements. 
Cleaning is difficult and it is often hard to be sure the reprocessing 
equipment is completely clean. An on-line assay method would be useful 
in reprocessing systems. 
Throughout the nuclear fuel cycle there are applications for assay 
methods for uranium and plutonium. The ability of a nuclear materials 
handler to meet his accountability obligations without economic disruption 
of his operation depends directly upon the assay methods he chooses. Ac-
curacy of an assay method is important because it establishes a limit of 
error in the material unaccounted for (LEMUF), but factors other than ac-
curacy may determine the applicability of a given assay method. There 
are applications which require a non-destructive method to prevent dis-
semination of materials or the destruction of fabricated elements, to 
measure a large fraction of material flow to circumvent sampling problems, 
or to assay materials in places where access is difficult. Some applica-
tions require an assay in the presence of a large gamma ray background 
or the assay of materials for isotopic content of fissionable materials. 
In this thesis a non-destructive assay method, applicable to several 
stages in the fuel cycle, is developed, and its feasibility is explored 
for use in safeguards situation requiring a non-destructive, isotopic as-
say relatively resistant to the presence of gamma radiation. 
12 
CHAPTER II 
CURRENT METHODS OF ANALYSIS OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS 
To meet current safeguard requirements and for economic reasons, 
the composition of nuclear materials must be monitored at various stages 
of the nuclear fuel cycle. Accuracies required by NRC and IAEA regulations 
for nuclear materials accountability are 0.5 to 1.0 percent of the total 
8 9 
materials balance at the 1 a (65% confidence) level. ' (Accuracy is used 
throughout this paper to refer to probable deviation from the true value; 
precision is used to describe consistency and repeatability of data.) 
LEMUF, limit of error of the material unaccounted for, requirements differ 
at various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle according to the risk of di-
version and strategic (bomb potential) value of the material at any par-
ticular stage. NRC requirements are also based on currently obtainable 
accuracies and are updated as measurement capability improves. 
The methods used to assay special nuclear material should incor-
porate several characteristics. Ideally, an assay should be fast and 
accurate. Time is essential in process control situations, and quick 
detection of a diversion is necessary for credible safeguards. Unfor-
tunately, speed and accuracy are sometimes mutually incompatible param-
eters. For methods where accuracy is dependent on counting statistics, 
longer counts usually mean better accuracy per sample but may mean that 
fewer samples can be taken of a given process or shipment. Insensitivity 
to self-shielding effects is important when nuclear materials may be 
13 
hidden by the finite thickness of the sample. In some applications, such 
as spent fuel elements, the assay system must tolerate intense gamma ray 
fields. Some situations, such as analysis of fresh fuel elements, require 
a non-destructive assay method if a substantial part of the throughput 
is to be measured. Non-destructive analysis is often desirable, to de-
crease sampling problems by allowing a larger fraction of the material 
flow to be assayed. 
The accuracy with which material flow can be measured is limited 
in many instances by sampling biases. Solids often are found to be not 
homogeneous in isotopic makeup or particle size, and liquids, particu-
larly solutions of plutonium, contain suspended or settled out solids or 
12 
sludge. Methods that infer the compositions of large volumes of ma-
terials from small samples suffer the most from sampling problems. Some 
materials, such as pellets inside assembled fuel elements, cannot be 
sampled in practice. 
In a closed materials balance for safeguards accountability, all 
materials moving into and out of each step in the nuclear fuel cycle must 
be measured. For a closed materials balance, the following equation must 
hold. 
(Input + Beginning Inventory) - (Output + Ending Inventory + Waste) = 0 
Typically it does not, and the discrepancy, MUF, represents material 
lost (or gained) by unknown channels, or material that may have been di-
12 
vertedo The assay method discussed in subsequent chapters is a candi-
date for use in a closed materials balance where more than one fissionable 
isotope is present, such as plutonium recycle fuel, light-water reactor 
14 
discharge fuel, HTGR fuel where uranium-233 and uranium-235 may be found 
together, fuel refabrication, and reprocessing waste. It may also be 
used in conjunction with another method, such as calorimetry, where pre-
cise knowledge of the ratio of two fissile isotopes can improve the ac-
curacy of another measurement. 
In plutonium recycle, PuO may be mixed with U0 9 in the fuel, 
or the fuel element may contain plutonium as the only fissile isotope. 
In either case the fissile isotopes will be in concentrations of < 5 
atom percent in uranium-238. Light water reactor-spent fuel will contain 
uranium-235 and plutonium-239 in about equal concentrations, typically 
0.5 to 1.5 atom percents, together with fission products that are intense 
gamma ray emitters. In reprocessing and fuel fabrication waste, uranium-
235 and plutonium may occur in almost any concentration in solid or liquid 
form. The uranium will not normally be more than five percent enriched in 
uranium-235 if only commercial light-water reactor fuel is processed. Plu-
tonium in the LWR fuel cycle typically contains 10 to 20 percent plutonium-
13 
240 and about five percent plutonium-241. HTGR fuels will be highly en-
riched in uranium-233. As fast breeder fuel cycles are established, highly 
enriched uranium will be used in the fuel, but when the cycle is stabil-
ized only one fissile isotope, plutonium-239, will be used. Plutonium 
and highly enriched uranium will probably not be used in the same fuel 
elements. 
The analysis method described in Chapter III can compete with a 
number of analytical methods now in use or being developed for applica-
tions requiring fissile isotope identification; among them are wet chem-
istry, mass spectrometry, lead slowing-down spectrometer, coincidence 
15 
counting, and delayed neutron analysis. 
Wet Chemistry 
Wet chemical analysis generally requires a sample to be removed 
from the material flow and dissolved, if not already in solution. After 
removal of interfering ions the uranium or plutonium content of the sample 
is determined by precipitation or titration. Potentiometric titration, 
where oxidation or reduction potential is compared to a standard half-
cell to detect the titration end point for determination of uranium, can 
14 easily obtain precisions of 0.2 to 0.5 percent. 
Plutonium is not stable in solution under some pH conditions, 
forming stable polymers with water that are not easily redissolved. In 
addition uranium, which is often more abundant in the sample than pluton-
ium, is an interfering ion that cannot be completely removed. In cases 
where there is a large uranium component, such as LWR discharge fuel, use 
of amperometric or coulometric methods to determine titration end points 
limits the interference of uranium. In amperometric titration, a current 
is passed through, and the element of interest is plated out„ The current 
remains constant until the end point is reached; then it begins to change 
linearly with time. Coulometric titration is the integral of ampero-
metric titration. Precisions of better than 0.2 percent are available 
for samples containing 10 mg plutonium. 
Accuracies reported for wet chemical methods are generally better 
than 1.0 percent. Discrepancies between different laboratories are prob-
ably due to one or more interfering ions and the slightly different tech-
niques used. Sampling may be a problem also, since the composition of 
large volumes of materials must often be inferred from small samples. 
Mass Spectrometry 
In a mass spectrometer a very small sample, a few micrograms, is 
vaporized. The atoms or molecules of the sample are then accelerated in 
an electric field and directed through a magnetic field to a charge col-
lector or photographic plate. The paths taken by the constituents of the 
sample in the magnetic field, and their impact positions on the target, 
are functions of the charge to mass ratio. Double-focusing mass spectrom-
eters are precise to parts per million, but the equipment is expensive 
and obtaining small samples that are representative of the sampled mater-
ial is difficult. The mass spectrometer is widely used for determining 
isotopic mass ratios, particularly in enrichment plants. Equipment avail-
able today can determine uranium-235 concentration to an accuracy of 0.15 
12 
percent. Isotopic dilution techniques, where the sample or parent batch 
is spiked with an isotope not normally present, such as uranium-233 and 




X- or gamma-ray radiography is of little use in distinguishing 
between the heavy elements and isotopes since the electron densities of 
heavy elements vary little from element to element, and not at all among 
isotopes of the same element. Neutron cross sections, however, vary con-
siderably among the heavy elements and their isotopes. Neutron radiog-
raphy, therefore, can be a useful tool in safeguards applications. 
In neutron radiography a shadow image is made of the sample, which 
is placed in a neutron beam with little divergence for sharpness. The 
degree of shadowing is proportional to the neutron capture cross sections. 
17 
Both high energy neutron generators and reactor beams have been used as 
sources. Direct and indirect imaging techniques have been used. Recently, 
a new imaging technique has been developed that shows some promise; a 
"fission plate" is placed over a glass or plastic sheet and the fission 
tracks are etched out of the glass or plastic after exposure. This method 
has excellent gamma rejection and good definition due to the short range 
e *• • f ,.16 of fission fragments. 
Resonance self-indication analysis is a radiographic method of 
analysis using the energy-dependence cross sections. For this type of 
analysis a beam of epithermal neutrons with some arbitrary energy distri-
bution is obtained by passing a reactor neutron beam through a thin sheet 
of cadmium. The beam is then tested, with and without the sample, with 
fission chambers, i.e., proportional counters lined with plutonium-239 
or uranium-235. The sample is then interposed between the neutron source 
and the detectors. If the sample contains uranium-235 the beam will be 
deficient in neutrons of energies that correspond to the resonance peaks 
of uranium-235, and the uranium-235 fission chamber will show a decrease 
in beam intensity, whereas, the plutonium-239 fission chamber, which has 
different resonances, will be relatively unchanged. The effect is sim-
ilar to using color filters in photography. 
Neutron radiographs of the SEFOR fuel showed dramatically that 
about half of the pellets in the fuel rods were deficient in plutonium 
and that the bad pellets were randomly distributed. If a radiograph had 
been made upon receipt of the rods, the failure of the first fuel loading 
could have been avoided. 
Because variations in geometry (e.g., due to sample thickness) 
produce effects similar to fissile isotope loading, quantitative analysis 
with neutron radiography can be difficult. However, neutron radiography 
provides a good indication of fissile isotope distribution. Pellets 10 
percent deficient in plutonium-239 were easily detected in SEFOR fuel. 
Gamma-Ray Spectrometry 
Passive gamma counting can be done on new fuel material to see the 
characteristic gamma photopeaks of the uranium and plutonium isotopes. 
On irradiated materials, some fission products gamma-rays can be used to 
determine burnup and fuel composition. 
A 184 keV gamma-ray is emitted by uranium-235 as a natural-decay 
gamma-ray and it can be counted with a Nal(Tl) scintillator detector for 
an indication of the amount of uranium-235 present. The 184 keV gamma-
ray is of such low energy that it is easily stopped by relatively thin 
layers of heavy materials. The attenuation from six mm of uranium is 
more than 99 percent. Counting of the 184 keV gamma-ray should include 
attenuation correction factors for assay if the equivalent heavy metal 
1 o 
thickness of the sample exceeds about 0.4 mm. 
The gamma-rays of interest in plutonium analysis are bunched into 
a band around 400 keV. High-resolution Ge(Li) detectors are generally 
used for plutonium assay, rather than the high efficiency, lower resolution 
Nal(Tl) detectors used in assay for uranium-235. Solutions of plutonium 
nitrate in long, thin bottles have been assayed using gamma-ray spectrom-
19 
etry with accuracies of five percent. This method is not practical for 
the analysis of spent fuel because of the probability of radiation damage 
to the semiconductor detector in the intense fission-product gamma-ray 
field. 
Fission product gamma-rays can be used in a normal neutron activa-
tion analysis manner to measure fissile isotope content and to determine 
the ratio of fissioning isotopes. Gamma-ray scanning of spent fuel for 
fission product gamma-ray peaks for determination of burnup is a somewhat 
extreme example of neutron activation analysis. Fission products useful 
in activation analysis of fissile materials have high energy gamma-ray 
peaks, providing good penetration of high-Z materials and low interfer-
ence from Compton scattering from other peaks, high yield from fission, 
and a significant difference in yield between the fissioning nuclides 
that participate in the assay. To be useful in gamma-ray scanning of 
spent fuel for burnup measurements, fission products should have a rela-
tively long half-life and low neutron cross section, to minimize satura-
20 
tion effects, and a low propensity to diffuse out of a fuel element. 
Analysis for uranium-235 to plutonium-239 may be done by estimating total 
fissions from determinations of a single fission product, such as cesium-
138, that has nearly equal yield for uranium-235 and plutonium-239 fis-
sions, then determining the uranium-235 to plutonium-239 ratio from a 
fission product that has a greater yield for one fissile nuclide than the 
such as ruthenium-106 which has a yield from plutonium-239 fission that 
is 5.5 times as great as the yield for uranium-235 fission. 
Total burnup measurements of spent fuel by gamma-ray scanning have 
21 
been reported with accuracies of 5.0 percent. Fissile contents have 
been found with precisions of 2o0 percent using two or more fission 
22 
products in the analysis. 
20 
Lead Slowing-Down Spectrometer 
When high-energy neutrons are introduced into a large mass of lead 
they diffuse through it and lose energy by a large number of elastic col-
lisions. The great difference between the mass of lead nuclei and that 
of the neutrons requires that the neutrons have a large number of elastic 
encounters before reaching thermal energies and, therefore, spend a long 
time, relative to a hydrogenous medium, in slowing down. If the pile of 
lead is pulsed with monoenergetic neutrons, all of the neutrons in the 
pile will have about the same energy at a given time after the pulse be-
cause each neutron will have had about the same large number of elastic 
collisions and lost, on the average, the same percentage of energy in each 
collision. The number of neutrons reacting with a sample in the pile at 
a given time after the initiation pulse is an indication of the cross sec-
23 
tion of the sample at the neutron energy corresponding to that time. 
The source pulse length must be short compared to the neutron slowing down 
time, around 200 ^s to reach a few eV, for good resolution, and must be 
intense enough to overcome high leakage, 96 percent in 10 \is for a 1.33 
24 
meter block of lead. 
Cross section can be measured as a function of energy by record-
ing neutron transmission of the sample, capture gamma-rays, emissions 
from fission, etc. as a function of time after the pulse of neutrons in-
jected into the lead pile. Repeated pulses are used to build up statistics 
and sample response counts are stored in a multichannel analyzer, each 
channel representing a certain time interval after a neutron pulse,, Re-
sponse is not dependent on pulse frequency as long as all the neutrons 
21 
from a pulse thermalize or diffuse out before the next cycle. 
Isotopic composition of a sample can be determined by the resonant 
absorption peaks in the energy-dependent neutron cross sections of the 
different types of nuclides present in the sample. An assay is normally 
made by comparing energy dependent neutron cross-section data from a 
sample to data collected, using the same sample geometry, from a standard 
of known composition. 
Assay procedures of fuel materials using a lead slowing-down time 
spectrometer are currently being developed at Karlsruhe and the Univer-
sity of Michigan. The lead slowing-down time spectrometer may find use 
in spent fuel assays, where detection of neutron cross sections will allow 
use of neutron detectors and provide some discrimination against fission 
product gamma-rays. 
Prompt Neutron Analysis 
When a uranium or plutonium nucleus fissions, several gamma-rays 
and neutrons accompany the fission. These prompt emissions can be used to 
analyze a sample for fissionable material with coincident counting tech-
niques to discriminate against fission-causing neutrons and (a,n) reac-
tions. The sample to be assayed is surrounded by a number of detectors 
and is exposed to a source of neutrons. The source must generate neutrons 
that are not correlated to each other in time so that source neutrons do 
not activate coincidence circuitry in the detector system; (Y,n) sources, 
124 
such as Sb-Be, are used. Accumulation of counts indicating a fission 
in the sample requires coincident detection of neutrons in two or more of 
25 
the detectors around the sample. This method is good for total assay 
22 
of fissile material, but, because differences between neutrons-per-
fission values are small for the different fissile nuclides this method 
is not useful for isotopic assay of fuel material. 
Analysis by Delayed Neutrons 
After a fission event, some neutrons will be emitted during the 
decay of a number of fission products. These delayed neutrons are emitted 
immediately following a beta decay in a fission product or an isobar in 
the fission product decay chain. The process is described more thoroughly 
in Chapter III. Differences in the abundance and half lives of these 
delayed neutron emitters for different fissile nuclides arise from the 
distribution of fission products for various nuclides, as explained in 
Chapter III. 
Ten years ago delayed neutrons were used to look for uranium trapped 
in leached fuel element hulls in reprocessing operations. ' Actually, 
no 
analysis of uranium by delayed neutrons goes back much farther. Delayed 
neutron analysis methods almost always use pulse techniques to distin-
guish the delayed neutrons from prompt neutrons and from any neutrons 
used in the interrogation pulse. Only delayed neutrons appear after ter-
mination of the interrogation pulse. Three general classes of analysis 
by delayed neutrons have been reported. First, the sample may be moved 
past a neutron source and the delayed neutrons are then counted after the 
sample has been moved away from the source. Since delayed neutrons occur 
after less than one percent of all fissions, such a single interrogation 
pulse technique yields poor sensitivity. Secondly, the sample may be pulsed 
repeatedly and counted between interrogation pulses. If the time between 
interrogation pulses is shorter than about 0.1 second, corresponding to 
23 
the shortest half life of a delayed neutron group (see Chapter III), 
the delayed neutron response will not be a function of interrogation 
29 
pulse rate, and the data obtained are a function of the total delayed 
neutron activity. This technique has been used to measure total fissile 
content in samples of known isotopic composition, such as containers of 
30 
UF,, to within one percent. 
o 
When the time between interrogation pulses is long compared to 
the longest half life of a delayed neutron group, the delayed neutron 
activity falls off between pulses as the sum of a number of exponential 
decays, each corresponding to the decay of a delayed neutron precursor. 
This decay curve is different for each fissile nuclide because different 
31 
delayed neutron abundances and half lives are involved. 
Two versions of this type of delayed neutron analysis have been 
developed at Los Alamos by Keepin's group over the past several years; 
total delayed neutron counting and isotopic analysis by "time fiducial" 
31 
techniques. The first method, total delayed neutron counting, is 
straightforward. The sample was pulsed with a square-wave neutron beam 
with a duty cycle of about 50 percent and a period shorter than the period 
30 
of the shortest delayed neutron group, typically 50 to 100 ms. Delayed 
neutrons were counted during the 50 percent of the time that the sample 
was not in the interrogation flux. For this mode of irradiation, the 
measured delayed neutron count rate is proportional to the time-integrated 
delayed neutron yield and, in turn, to the amount of fissionable material 
30 
present. Variations in the pulse rate make little difference in the 
delayed-neutron activity as long as the pulse period remains short compared 
29 
to the shortest delayed neutron period. No attempt has been made to 
correlate delayed neutron activity with pulse period. By comparison 
with a standard of known mass and composition, a fuel element of known 
isotopic composition may be assayed to an accuracy of several percent, 
• • 31 
depending on composition. 
In the "time fiducial" method the analysis is performed by pulsing 
a sample with neutrons and observing the decay of the delayed neutron re-
32 
sponse after the pulse. The ratio of the number of delayed neutrons 
counted before some fixed time after the end of the interrogating pulse 
to the number of delayed neutrons counted after that fixed time (time 
fiducial) can be used to determine the fissile nuclide. The ratio of 
counts before to that after the time fiducial is determined by the ratio 
of abundances of short-half-life delayed neutrons to long-half-life de-
layed neutrons, which varies between the fissile nuclide, as discussed in 
Chapter III. Pulse widths were shorter than the shortest half life de-
layed neutron group, 100 |is or less, and the time fiducial was chosen to 
give the best discrimination between the fissile nuclides. Pulses were 
repeated to build up statistics, but the delayed neutron response of the 
sample was allowed to die away between incident neutron pulses. The in-
terrogation pulses were produced with a 14 MeV neutron generator. The 
235 /239 
ratio U/ Pu has been measured in spent LWR fuel with a burnup of 1000 
MWd/T with precisions of 10 percent and in fresh fuel with accuracies of 
21 
around five percent. Delayed neutrons have been used by the Los Alamos 
group more recently to locate plutonium in containers of contaminated 
waste. Delayed neutron response to repetitive pulses of varying frequency 
25 
and duration were not investigated. 
Mass spectrometry and wet chemical analysis offer assay precisions 
that are better than the non-destructive analysis methods, but generate 
sampling problems and are difficult to use in some situations. Of the 
non-destructive analysis (NDA) methods available, none are applicable to 
all safeguards situations. Gamma ray spectrometry, delayed neutron anal-
ysis, and coincident neutron counting are NDA methods that are able to 
distinguish between different nuclides in nuclear fuel. Neutron detecting 
methods are useful in the assay of spent fuel materials because neutron 
detectors can be made to discriminate, somewhat, against the fission prod-
uct gamma-rays that accompany spent fuel. The assay method described in 
the following chapters offers promise for good accuracy and immunity to 
gamma-ray interference. It is a non-destructive method which can differ-
entiate between fissile nuclides by observing delayed neutrons after a 
pulse of interrogating neutrons induces fissions in the sample. This 
method, an extension of a technique to measure half-lives of activated 
29 
indium developed for a special problems course in 1969, differs from 
the work done at Los Alamos by H. 0. Menlove, R. H. Auguston, G. N. Henry, 
and others in that the fissile nuclide composition of a sample is inferred 
from the frequency-dependent delayed neutron response of the sample to 
interrogating pulses rather than the time-dependent response. The fre-
quency-dependent method allows more interrogation neutrons to be admini-
stered to the sample per unit time, and, therefore, more rapid accumulation 




BACKGROUND AND THEORY 
Methods of fissile isotope analysis that utilize delayed neutrons 
have characteristics that recommend their use in nuclear fuel cycle and 
safeguards applications. These methods are non-destructive; they can be 
used with any geometry sample and damage to or depletion of the sample 
is negligible. Fission parameters and delayed neutron precursor half-
lives are completely insensitive to the intense gamma radiation fields 
associated with spent reactor fuel, and neutron detectors discriminate, 
somewhat, against gamma rays; so the method is useful for both fresh and 
irradiated fuel. Nuclear material is easily penetrated by fast interro-
gation neutrons. In fact, it may prove possible to measure axial concen-
tration of fissionable nuclides by interrogation with neutrons of two or 
more distinctly different energies. 
Delayed Neutrons 
Methods that attempt fissile nuclide assay of nuclear material by 
delayed neutrons rely on the differences in intensities of the six observ-
able delayed neutron groups generated by different fissioning species. 
The process by which these differences arise is straightforward and will 
be explored in the following paragraphs. 
In the same year that neutron-induced nuclear fission was discovered, 
33 
Roberts, Meyer and Wang observed that some of the neutrons born of fis-
sion appeared at time intervals after the actual scission. The importance 
27 
of this discovery was not lost on Enrico Fermi and others who built the 
first fission chain reactors with only slight apprehension of the disaster 
that would have resulted from a reaction propagated by prompt neutrons 
alone. Delayed neutrons are so necessary to the control of fission reac-
tions that, since 1939, a great number of studies have been launched to 
find and refine half-life, energy and abundance information about them. 
The delayed neutrons are assumed, both for theoretical reasons to be dis-
cussed later and for empirical reasons, to die away as a linear super-
position of exponential decays. If a least-squares fitting to delayed 
neutron data is used, it is seen that six exponential periods generate a 
good fit for fissioning materials. If five or fewer groups are used, 
satisfactory convergence is not obtained and indicated errors are large. 
If seven or more groups are used, the weighted variance, defined as 
S2 = —^—r Y W. (Y. • - Y. . ) 2 (3-1) 
n - k /_, i l obs l calc 
i=l 
is larger, indicating a poorer fit, than is obtained for six-group fitted 
34 
parameters. A typical set of half-life and abundance parameters is 
35 
given for fast and thermal fission in Tables 2 and 3, taken from Keepin. 
It is apparent from Tables 2 and 3 that variations in group yields 
are much greater than the variations among group periods for the isotopes 
listed. Also, the total delayed neutron yield increases with neutron-
proton difference for a given fissioning nuclide due, primarily, to short 
half-life groups; and the total delayed neutron yield generally decreases 
with atomic number. It is these variations that are the basis of this 
28 
T a b l e 2 . D e l a y e d - N e u t r o n H a l f - L i v e s , Decay C o n s t a n t s 





H a l f - l i f e 
( s e c ) 
Decay c o n s t a n t 
(sec --1-) 
R e l a t i v e 
abundance 
A b s o l u t e group 
y i e l d , % 
U-235 (99.9% 235) 
1 54 51 ± 0 . 9 4 0 .0127 ± 0 .0002 0 .038 ± 0 .003 0 .063 ± 0 .005 
2 21 84 ± 0 . 5 4 0 .0317 ± 0 .0008 0 .213 ± 0 .005 0 . 3 5 1 ± 0 . 0 1 1 
3 6 00 ± 0 .17 0 . 1 1 5 ± 0 .003 0 .188 ± 0 .016 0 .310 ± 0 .028 
4 2 23 ± 0 . 0 6 0 . 3 1 1 ± 0 .008 0 .407 ± 0 .007 0 .672 ± 0 .023 
5 0 496 ± 0 .029 1.40 ± 0 . 0 8 1 0 .128 ± 0 .008 0 . 2 1 1 ± 0 .015 
6 0 179 ± 0 .017 3 .87 ± 0 .369 0 .026 ± 0 .003 0 .043 ± 0 .005 
U-238 (99.98% 238) 
1 52 .38 ± 1 . 2 9 0 .0132 ± 0 .0003 0 . 0 1 3 ± 0 . 0 0 1 0 .054 ± 0 . 0 0 5 
2 2 1 . 5 8 ± 0 . 3 9 0 . 0 3 2 1 ± 0 . 0 0 0 6 0 .137 ± 0 . 0 0 2 0 .564 ± 0 . 0 2 5 
3 5 .00 ± 0 . 1 9 0 .139 ± 0 . 0 0 5 0 .162 ± 0 . 0 2 0 0 .667 ± 0 . 0 8 7 
4 1.93 ± 0 .07 0 .358 ± 0 .014 0 .388 ± 0 .012 1.599 ± 0 . 0 8 1 
5 0 .490 ± 0 .023 1.41 ± 0 .067 0 . 2 2 5 ± 0 .013 0 .927 ± 0 .060 
6 0 .172 ± 0 . 0 0 9 4 . 0 2 ± 0 . 2 1 4 0 .075 ± 0 . 0 0 5 0 .309 ± 0 . 0 2 4 
U-233 (100% 233) 
1 5 5 . 1 1 ± 1 . 8 6 0 .0126 ± 0 . 0 0 0 4 0 .086 ± 0 . 0 0 3 0 .060 ± 0 . 0 0 3 
2 2 0 . 7 4 ± 0 . 8 6 0 .0334 ± 0 .0014 0 .274 ± 0 . 0 0 5 0 .192 ± 0 . 0 0 9 
3 5 .30 ± 0 . 1 9 0 . 1 3 1 ± 0 . 0 0 5 0 .227 ± 0 . 0 3 5 0 .159 ± 0 . 0 2 5 
4 2 .29 ± 0 . 1 8 0 .302 ± 0 . 0 2 4 0 .317 ± 0 . 0 1 1 0 .222 ± 0 . 0 1 2 
5 0 . 5 4 6 ± 0 . 1 0 8 1.27 ± 0 . 2 6 6 0 .073 ± 0 . 0 1 4 0 . 0 5 1 ± 0 . 0 1 0 
6 0 . 2 2 1 ± 0 . 0 4 2 3 . 1 3 ± 0 . 6 7 5 0 .023 ± 0 . 0 0 7 0 .016 ± 0 . 0 0 5 
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T a b l e 3 . D e l a y e d - N e u t r o n H a l f - L i v e s , Decay C o n s t a n t s , 
and Y i e l d s from Thermal F i s s i o n ( r e f . ( 3 5 ) ) 
Group Half-life Decay constant Relative Absolute group 
index, (sec) (sec-J-) abundance yield, % 
i 
U-235 (99.9% 235) 
1 55 .72 . ± 1 . 2 8 0 . 0 1 2 4 ± 0 . 0 0 0 3 0 .033 ± 0 . 0 0 3 0 .052 ± 0 . 0 0 5 
2 22 .72 ± 0 . 7 1 0 . 0 3 0 5 ± 0 . 0 0 1 0 0 .219 ± 0 . 0 0 9 0 .346 ± 0 . 0 1 8 
3 6 .22 ± 0 . 2 3 0 . 1 1 1 ± 0 . 0 0 4 0 .196 ± 0 . 0 2 2 0 .310 ± 0 . 0 3 6 
4 2 .30 ± 0 . 0 9 0 . 3 0 1 ± 0 . 0 1 1 0 .395 ± 0 . 0 1 1 0 .624 ± 0 .026 
5 0 .610 ± 0 . 0 8 3 1.14 ± 0 . 1 5 0 . 1 1 5 ± 0 . 0 0 9 0 .182 ± 0 . 0 1 5 
6 0 . 2 3 0 ± 0 . 0 2 5 3 . 0 1 ± 0 . 2 9 0 .042 ± 0 . 0 0 8 0 .066 ± 0 . 0 0 8 
Pu-239 (99 .8% 239) 
1 5 4 . 2 8 ± 2 . 3 4 0 .0128 ± 0 .0005 0 .035 ± 0 .009 0 . 0 2 1 ± 0 .006 
2 2 3 . 0 4 ± 1 . 6 7 0 . 0 3 0 1 ± 0 .0022 0 .298 ± 0 . 0 3 5 0 .182 ± 0 . 0 2 3 
3 5 .60 ± 0 . 4 0 0 . 1 2 4 ± 0 . 0 0 9 0 . 2 1 1 ± 0 . 0 4 8 0 .129 ± 0 . 0 3 0 
4 2 .13 ± 0 . 2 4 0 . 3 2 5 ± 0 . 0 3 6 0 .326 ± 0 . 0 3 3 0 .199 ± 0 . 0 2 2 
5 0 .618 ± 0 . 2 1 3 1.12 ± 0 . 3 9 0 .086 ± 0 . 0 2 9 0 .052 ± 0 . 0 1 8 
6 0 .257 ± 0 .045 2 .69 ± 0 . 4 8 0 .044 ± 0 .016 0 .027 ± 0 .010 
U-233 (100% 233) 
1 55.00 ± 0.54 0.0126 ± 0.0003 0.086 ± 0.003 0.057 ± 0.003 
2 2 0 . 5 7 ± 0 . 3 8 0 .0337 ± 0 . 0 0 0 6 0 .299 ± 0 . 0 0 4 0 .197 ± 0 . 0 0 9 
3 5 .00 ± 0 . 2 1 0 .139 ± 0 . 0 0 6 0 .252 ± 0 . 0 4 0 0 .166 ± 0 . 0 2 7 
4 2 . 1 3 ± 0 . 2 0 0 .325 ± 0 . 0 3 0 0 .278 ± 0 . 0 2 0 0 .184 ± 0 . 0 1 6 
5 0 . 6 1 5 ± 0 .242 1.13 ± 0 .40 0 , 0 5 1 ± 0 . 0 2 4 0 .034 ± 0 .016 
6 0 .277 ± 0 . 0 4 7 2 . 5 0 ± 0 . 4 2 0 . 0 3 4 ± 0 . 0 1 4 0 .022 ± 0 . 0 0 9 
30 
particular method of nondestructive analysis by delayed neutrons. 
Delayed neutrons are produced when a member of a fission product 
decay chain decays to an energy level for a nuclide whose excitation 
energy is greater than the binding energy of a neutron, E . This process 
is indicated in Figure 1. When a nuclide finds itself in such a situation 
it generally disposes of its excess energy in one of three processes: 
beta decay, gamma decay, or delayed neutron emission. Beta and gamma de-
cay are, of course, the normal means of decay when the excitation energy 
is not sufficient to eject a neutron. When a neutron can be ejected, 
decay paths n, and n , neutron emission usually competes favorably with 
beta or gamma decay, which are somewhat hindered; whereas, neutron emis-
sion is highly favored for nuclides with sufficient excitation energy. 
The probability that a neutron will be emitted varies from zero for a 
neutron energy (in excess of neutron binding energy) of zero to unity for 
neutron energy greater than about 50 keV. 
The probability that a given nucleus resulting from fission will 
decay by neutron emission is defined as P . Theoretical P values can be 
J J n n 
estimated using the original Bohr-Wheeler mechanism of delayed neutron 
emission. 
QB 
f(z + i , Q - E) (E) [ r / r + rR)dE 
B b n y P 
P = — ( 3 - 2 ) 
•QB 
f ( z + 1, Q - E) (E)dE 
0 B 
,A 0 < E < E 
( E ) = I b(E-E )* 
LAe°U Lc) E < E < Q„ 
c ^B 
PRECURSOR 
(Z + I.N-I ) 
Figure 1. Energy Levels in Delayed Neutron Emission 
LJ 
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A is the mass number, z is charge, and r , Tn, and T are the partial 
n P Y 
widths for neutron, beta, and gamma-ray decay. E is the critical energy 
for pairing effects. Q and B are shell sensitive parameters and can be 
expressed as functions of charge displacement, Z - Z, where Z is the 
o r 
"most stable" Z for a given number of neutrons, N. P is essentially 
n 
constant for a given nuclide regardless of the fissioning nuclide. 
Equation 3-2 breaks down and consistency of P is lost in the presence 
n 
of isomerism among delayed neutron precursors; i.e., a variation of rela-
tive population of isomeric and ground states with the type of fission 
35 
would imply a dependence of P on Z and A of the fissioning nuclide. 
However, current experimental evidence and shell theory interpretations 
indicate that conditions for isomerism and for delayed neutron emission 
are mutually exclusive. Figure 2 shows the region of most probable de-
layed neutron precursors from calculations of P , shown by shaded bound-
7 ft 
aries in a nuclide chart. These regions do not include nucleons with 
magic numbers of protons or neutrons. 
It is evident that the probability of delayed neutron emission and 
the half-life of a delayed neutron precursor are independent of the fis-
sioning nuclide. Differences in delayed neutron abundances and group half-
lives must, then, come from differences in total fission yields of the 
various precursors for different fissioning nuclides. 
Each fissioning nuclide is characterized by a mass distribution 
curve and, for each mass, A, on the mass distribution curve, a charge 
distribution curve characterized by a most probable primary nuclear charge, 
Z , and a distribution of primary nuclear charges around Z . Typical mass 
Bal36 
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Figure 2. Chart of the Nuclides with Regions Expected to Contai 
Delayed Neutron Precursors Outlined with Hash Marks 
34 
and charge distribution curves are shown in Figure 3. The locus of Z 
values for a given fissioning nuclide is a line parallel to the line of 
most stable nuclear charges Z4. The average fission chain length, Z. - Z , 
b A & A p 
varies from 3.6 for uranium-233 to 4.5 for uranium-238, with fissioning 
nuclides of higher (N - Z) values having longer fission chain lengths. 
A given delayed neutron precursor may lie well within the fission fragment 
charge distribution curve for uranium-238 and be only on the tail of the 
uranium-233 fission fragment charge distribution curve. The relative 
abundance for such a delayed neutron precursor would be much greater for 
uranium-238 fission than for uranium-233 fission due both to the larger 
primary yield and to the larger yield of lower Z nuclides that feed the 
delayed neutron precursor in their decay chain. This effect is greater 
for increased distance from the line of most stable charge. Since beta 
half-lives are shorter for greater distances from the charge stability 
line, the effect is noted primarily with short-period delayed neutrons. 
Differences in the fission fragment mass yield distributions have a simi-
lar, but less pronounced, effect. 
Differences in delayed neutron group periods among the fissionable 
nuclides also arise from differences in fission chain lengths. When longer 
decay chains lead to a delayed neutron precursor, the precursor activity 
(and corresponding delayed neutron activity) exhibits a growth-decay be-
havior with time and the apparent delayed neutron period is lengthened. 
35 
The degree of lengthening is dependent on the beta periods involved. 
Even though the delayed neutron precursors are exactly the same 
isotopes for each fissioning nuclide, differences in the fission product 
mass distributions produce differences in absolute and relative delayed 
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NEUTRON NUMBER N 
Figure 3. Mass and Charge Distribution of Fission Fragments Leading 
to Differences in Abundances and Half-Lives of Delayed 
Neutrons 
neutron group yields; and differences in the average chain lengths (charge 
distributions) produce differences in both yields and periods of delayed 
neutron groups. Because each fissioning nuclide has characteristic fis-
sion product mass and charge distributions, there is a unique set of de-
layed neutron group yields and periods for each fissioning nuclide by which 
it may be identified 
Cyclic Activation 
For their delayed neutron analysis the Los Alamos group pulsed their 
sample repeatedly to accumulate good statistics, but they allowed delayed 
neutrons to die away after each interrogation pulse or did not allow suf-
ficient time between pulses for any significant decay of delayed neutron 
activity. No attempt was made to correlate intermediate frequencies of 
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cyclic activation to delayed neutron activity. In the remainder of this 
chapter the relationships between the parameters of an activation-wait-
count-wait cycle and the delayed neutron activity observed in the "count" 
part of the cycle are investigated. Results derived are applied to spe-
cific fissile nuclide analysis in later chapter, but the equations will be 
useful in a large number of cyclic activation applications. 
The differential equations that describe the activity of a cyclicly 
activated sample are well known in form; but solutions to these equations 
can be somewhat difficult when attempted in the time domain. Nonetheless, 
some useful solutions have been found with time domain math by Campbell 
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and Givens. (The work of Givens et al. is, however, flawed by an 
incorrect summation, but, in most cases, the error causes little error in 
the agreement between our experimental results and Givens' equations.) 
In this section a solution for steady state activity under cyclic 
37 
activation will be produced using Laplace transform techniques. 
The activity of a sample exposed to neutron radiation of a time 
independent nature and of known energy distribution is described by the 
differential equation: 
— = 0aN - \N (3-3) 
dt o 
where: 
0 is the neutron flux 
G is the activation cross section 
N is the parent atom population 
X is the decay constant of the daughter 
N is the population of activated daughter nuclides of interest 
Some of these parameters can be functions of time or other variable 
The activation cross section and decay constant are known to be generally 
independent of time. The parent atom population will be assumed to remain 
constant during irradiation; this assumption should be valid as long as 
there is no significant burnup of the sample. The time dependence of 
activity of the sample, related directly to daughter population, is the 
quantity of interest. The total activity is, of course, the sum of the 
activities of all the activation products. Each activation product can be 
considered separately and the activities of the products, from Equation 
(3-3), summed for the total activity. 
The neutron flux is a quantity in Equation (3-3) that can be varied 
in a time-dependent fashion, and, by observing the activation behavior, 
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some parameters of the activation equation can be deduced. Any modulation 
of the neutron flux that can be described by a mathematical function, such 
as a sine wave or exponential, is suitable for Laplace transform analysis; 
one of the simplest to achieve is square wave modulation, shown in Figure 
4, along with detector gate timing and induced activity expected in a 
sample. 
For square wave modulation the flux can be considered as an infinite 
sum of unit steps; one to turn the flux on, one at a later stage to turn 
it off, and so on. 
The neutron flux as a function of time is seen to be: 
0(t) = 0 [U(t) - U(t - b) + U(t - a) - U(t - b - a) . . .] (3-4) 
where: 
0 is the maximum flux 
m 
a is the time at which the flux turns on 
b is the time at which the flux turns off 
U(t) designates a unit step beginning at time (t) 
The time dependent flux is easily Laplace-transformed as a repetitive 
function as follows: 
0 (1 - e"aS) 
0(s) = [0(t)]=-2 — (3-5) 
/i ~ b s \ s(l - e ) 





























Figure 4. Timing Diagrams for the Activation Cycle Used 
to Derive Equation (3-28) 
sN(s) = o-N 0(s) - A.N(s) (3-6) 
Using the Laplace transform of the square wave modulated flux, Equation 
(3-5), and substituting for the constant-term, o~N 0 , the simpler A, pro-
duces the equation: 
sN(s) = | C1 " £_bs] - \N(s) (3-7) 
1 - e 
Solving for N(s) produces: 
N<s> = 7I7TTT [ 7 - T T S ] (3'8) 
To transform Equation (3-8) into the time domain the exponential term in 
the denominator can be expanded as an infinite series: 
M/ \ A /n ~
a swi , "bs . "2bs , "3bs . N ,0 nN N(s) = g(s + x ) (1 - e )(1 + e + e + e + . . .) (3-9) 
Then by use of partial fractions and by multiplying out the exponential 
terms the following is obtained: 
M/ \ A r1 1 i /-. , -bs -2bs , -3bs -(a+b)s ,„ ,̂ x N(s) = - L~ - g + XJ (1+e + e + e . . . - e
 v ' (3-10) 
-(a+2b)s 
- e • • •) 
Equation (3-10) can be transformed into the time domain: 
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N(s) - f [U(t)(l - e~Xt) +U(t - b)(l - e ~
U t _ b ) ) + . . . (3-11) 
U(t - a)(l - e-Ut-a)) - 0(t - (a + b))(l - ^('"(a-H.)), 
After an infinite number of cycles the number of daughter atoms is given 
by Equation (3-11). After a finite number of cycles, n, the number of 
daughter atoms can be found by summing the series of unit steps in 
Equation (3-11) only to that point in time where: 
(n - 1) < t < (n + l)b + a (3-12) 
This t ime c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e a c t i v a t i o n p o r t i o n of t h e n c y c l e . A l l of 
t he s t e p te rms c a n c e l e x c e p t U ( t - (n - l ) b ) , l e a v i n g : 
M/I-N ^ n " X t / i Xh 4- 2 ^ b ( n - l ) X b 
N ( t ) = — [ 1 - e ( 1 + e + e + . . . + e ) ( 3 - 1 3 ) 
A. 
+ e -
X ( t " a ) (1 + e A b +e
2Xh + . . . e < n - 2 > X b ) ] 
Each of the finite exponential series in Equation (3-13) has a simple sum. 
Summing the series and multiplying through by X/A produces: 
^.= 1 - e" [1^] + .-««=-) [* -
 e(n:b
1Hb] (3-14) 
1 - e 1 - e 
For the decay portion of the cycle, i.e., 
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(n - l ) b + a < t < nb ( 3 - 1 5 ) 
t he number of s t e p t e rms in E q u a t i o n ( 3 - 5 ) i s a g a i n f i n i t e . When t h e 
s e r i e s of s t e p t e rms i s summed a l l of t h e t e rms a g a i n c a n c e l e x c e p t t h e 
l a s t , U ( t - (n - l ) b + a ) p r o d u c i n g t h e e q u a t i o n : 
N ( t ) = — L" e ( 1 + e + e + . . . e ) ( 3 - 1 6 ) 
A 
- A ( t - a ) , . . Xb 2Ab ( n - l ) A b . n 
+ e ( 1 + e + e . . . e ) J 
Summing the exponential series and multiplying through by \/k produces: 
f = - e-« [i-^] + e-^-> [ i ^ ] (3-17) 
1 - e 1 - e 
Equations (3-14) and (3-17) constitute a complete solution for N(t) in 
the interval (n - l)b < t < nb. The e and e terms are independent 
of the number of cycles experienced and, therefore, represent decreasing 
transients. If sufficient time is allowed for the transients to die out, 
the steady state solutions are found to be: 
f o r (n - l ) b < t < (n - l ) b + a 
AN nAb-At ( n - l ) A b - A ( t - a ) 
-T3- = L + ~ T^b (3"18> 
1 - e 
and f o r (n - l ) b + a < t < nb 
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XN n\b-\t nXb-X(t-a) 
"ir = - r ^ (3"19) 
1 - e 
For simplicity time can be normalized to the start of a cycle; then 
t = t' - (n - l)b where t is real time. The steady state equations 
become: 
for 0 < t < a 
XN -(t-b)X -(t-a)X 
"IT = l + ~ ^ (3"2°) 
1 - e 
and for a < t < b 
XN -X(t-b) -X(t-(a+b)) 
ss _ e - e 
A -, Xb 
1 - e 
(3-21) 
To limit the background problem in this application, no data will be taken 
during the activation part of the cycle; i.e., while t = 0 -> a; therefore, 
knowledge of the steady state activity during the activation part of a 
cycle equation (3-20) is of no particular interest and attention will be 
focused on Equation (3-21) which describes the steady state activity for 
that part of the cycle during which no further activation occurs, t = a -> b 
in Figure 4. By expressing a as a fraction, x, of the cycle time and ob-
serving the activity at some other fraction, y, of a cycle time, b, the 
following is obtained from Equation (3-21): 
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a = xb 
t = yb 
1 > y > x 
\N -\b(y-l) _ -\b(y-x-l) 
A = ~ Xb~ 
1 - e 
Grouping terms in Equation (3-11) yields: 
(3-22) 
^N -Xb(y-l) 
— ^ = ~ n - C1 - e ] (3"23) 
A 1 - eXh 
Equation (3-23) describes the steady state activity for the non-activation 
portion of the cycle and has some interesting properties. If the cycle 
time is short, i.e., the frequency is high, the steady state activity can 
be shown to be independent of frequency. Taking the limit of the steady 
state activity as the cycle time approaches zero, using L'Hospital's rule 
and grouping terms has the following result: 
,N ± [e-Xb(y-1) . e-Xb(y-x-l) 
, . ss , . db -• . . 
lim — - — = lim — (3-24) 
u n A u n d n ^bT 
bn>0 b-*0 — [1 - e J 
^N w IN -Xb(y-l) . , 1X -\b(y-x-l) 
, - ss _ , . \(y - l)e 7 - \(y - x - l)e w ' 
lim — lim — w L *r L  
b_>0 A b-*0 - \eXb 
lim — ^ = (y - 1) - (y - x - 1) 
b-̂ 0 A 
\N 
, . ss 
lim — - — = x 
b->0 A 
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Equation (3-24) is no surprise; if the frequency of activation is very 
high, the level of activity reached will be proportional to the fraction 
of time spent in the neutron field. When the cycle time is long, i.e., 
the frequency is low, the steady state activity decreases exponentially 
with cycle time, which can be shown as follows: 
^N -\b(y-l) 
lim —22- = lim — — [ 1 - e A D X] (3-25) 
b-*» b->oo 1 - e 
\N -Xb(y-l) ., 
, . ss e r A.bxn 
lim — - — = 1_- e J 
b-^o 
i • ss _ -Xb(y-x) 
iim - — — e 
b->°° 
Equation (3-23) describes the steady state activity at some time, 
yb, in the cooling portion of the cycle. In the experiment, data acqui-
sition was not limited to a single discrete time; delayed neutron counts 
were collected over a finite portion of the cycle. The activity observed 
from the sample as it passes through this counting portion of the cycle 
is the integral of Equation (3-23) over that part of the cycle. 
A = 
w+c 
C1 - e" ] e ^ - " dy (3-26) 
w Ab 1 - e 
where: 
A is the activity observed 
w is the portion of the period between activation and counting 
c is the portion of the period spent counting 
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A' = i_-
^ u w + c -A.bx 
, Xb 
1 - e 
\ b -\by . 
e e dy ( 3 - 2 7 ) 
w 
n -Xbx - \ b y w+c 
= r 1 - e i e
x b - i 
1 - e 
1 - e r - \ b ( w + x ) -\bw-, 
= — I T h Le - e ] 
(e K* - 1 ) ( - Xb) 
(1 - e ) -,., -A.bww -?^bc . 
= Th ( 1 " e ) ( e - 1) 
b X ( l -e'Xb) 
Equation (3-27) is the response expected for the case of only one decay 
constant. The total delayed neutron response as a function of cycle time 
is as follows: 
n -\.bx -\.bw -A., be 
A ' = y ^ - e * ><e ' ><e ' - ^ (3-28) 
where: 
. th , n \ . is the l delayed neutron decay constant 
I 
n is the total number of delayed neutron decay constants 
If the logarithm of the activity, A in Equation (3-27), is plotted 
as a function of the cycle time, b, the resulting curve looks like Figure 
Any activation product will generate a characteristic curve when activity 
is plotted against cycle time, as in Figure 5, where the amplitude, break-
point, and slope of the long cycle time part of the curve are determined 
by the abundance and decay constant of the activation product. 
The single activation product response, described as a function of 

































Figure 5. Log Count Rate as a Function of Cycle Time (inverse frequency) Curve 
(The solid line results from the superposition of the count rates 
from two activation products having different half lives.) 
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times by Equation (3-25), begins to decrease with increasing cycle time at 
the break point described by setting equations (3-24) and (3-25) equal and 
solving for the cycle time, 
b
c = (T^fr <
3-29> 
The break point is a function of counting cycle parameters, x and y, and 
activation product decay constant, X. The activation fraction of a cycle, 
x, appears in the short cycle time response, Equation (3-24), as a constant 
in the level of response obtainable and in the long cycle time response, 
Equation (3-26), as part of an exponential term. If x is small, the de-
layed neutron response is also small; and as x approaches 100 percent, the 
dependency of the delayed neutron response on cycle time disappears. The 
length of the activation fraction of the cycle is, to some extent, a 
trade-off between ease of construction of equipment and precision of data 
analysis. In these experiments a wide beam of neutrons was chosen to 
retain a reasonable fraction of a cycle for activation while locating the 
neutron detectors away from the beam to decrease background. 
In the presence of six or more decay constants, the decay constants 
are not easily inferred from changes in the slopes in Equation (3-28). 
Furthermore, the situation is complicated by the various lengths of decay 
chains leading to the delayed neutron precursors, which, by growth and 
decay of precursors, produce changes in slopes. However, the delayed 
neutron activity vs cycle time plot is unique for each fissioning nuclide, 
and by comparison of these plots, the nuclides can be identified without 
computing delayed neutron abundances and half lives from the "signatures." 
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For cycle times that are short compared to the short-half-life delayed 
neutrons, the delayed neutron response is independent of cycle time, as 
seen in Equation (3-24). 
Because little decay occurs between subsequent reactivations, at 
short cycle times the delayed neutron response is independent of cycle 
time and contains contributions from all of the delayed neutron groups. 
This response is, therefore, an indication of the total number of delayed 
neutrons being produced. However, this information does not indicate 
the total amount of fissionable material present without knowledge of 
the isotopic makeup of the material. At longer cycle times, of the order 
of several seconds, the delayed neutron response reflects the abundances 
of only the longer half-life delayed neutron groups. In this region of 
cycle times, the responses of uranium-235 and plutonium-239 are different 
because the abundances and decay constants of the various delayed neutron 
groups are different for these two fissioning isotopes. When cycle times 
become long, 100 seconds or more, differences in delayed neutron responses 
between uranium-235 and plutonium-239 decrease because only the longest 
delayed neutron groups contribute to the response, and the activities de-
crease exponentially with cycle time, as seen in Equation (3-25). The 
ratio of the main fissile nuclides present, uranium-235 and plutonium-239, 
can, then, be inferred from the ratio of the short cycle time delayed 
neutron response to the delayed neutron at some intermediate cycle time. 
Plutonium-239 has a smaller delayed neutron response at all intermediate 
frequencies than uranium-235 because fission of plutonium-239 is less 
likely to produce delayed neutron precursors with long half-lives or long 
decay chains. 
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The theory of this chapter describes a response to periodic 
activation. Periodic activation can be accomplished by moving the sample 
into and out of a neutron beam, as was done in these experiments, or by 
pulsing the interrogation flux, as with a neutron chopper or neutron gen-
erator. If the interrogation flux is pulsed, the mathematical model 
developed here holds only if the pulse widths, wait times, and count 
times all remain fixed fractions of the entire cycle for all cycle times, 




EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES 
The mathematical model predicting different delayed neutron 
responses as a function of an activation-decay cycle for uranium-235 and 
plutonium-239, developed in Chapter III, was tested with experiments in-
tended also to evaluate the usefulness of an assay for different fissile 
nuclides based on this model for safeguards applications. The experi-
ment was designed for the exposure of small specimens to a fluctuating 
neutron beam by mounting them on a rotating arm that moved them steadily 
from the exposure site to a counter system and back again. The instru-
mentation needed to conduct these experiments did not have to be ex-
tremely sophisticated; yet, to amass statistics on delayed neutrons, 
care had to be taken to adequately shield the neutron detectors from in-
terrogating neutrons and prompt neutrons. Accuracies of the assays done 
in these experiments were dependent on counting statistics, precision of 
cycle time measurements, sample geometry, neutron flux and detector sen-
sitivity, and background. Cycle time measurements were made by counting 
pulses generated by the sample arm rotating mechanism, described later. 
The precision of these measurements was easily controlled, and was not a 
controlling factor in the accuracy to which assays could be obtained. 
The samples available for these experiments were limited to flat foils, 
unlike the material found in most safeguards situations. With such small 
foils, it was easier to move the samples into and out of a continuous 
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neutron beam rather than pulsing the beam. On the other hand, for the 
bulkier samples encountered in many safeguard applications, such as fuel 
rods, cyclic movement through a steady neutron beam would be awkward, and 
a neutron generator or beam chopper could be used to accomplish the cyclic 
activation better in that case. 
Figure 6 is a diagram of the experiment set-up. In these experi-
ments the neutron beam was not chopped, hence the delayed neutron detec-
tors had to be shielded from this potential source of background radiation 
The detectors were removed from the direct beam by rotating the samples 
on a circle, the axis of which was parallel to the beam. Distance be-
tween the detectors and the beam was limited by the beam diameter; large 
beam diameter allowed more distance between the beam and detector while 
retaining a reasonable percentage of the cycle for activation. 
Assay accuracy was found to be limited by counting statistics, as 
shown later. Counting statistics are controlled by the sensitivity of 
the detectors, the available neutron interrogation flux, and the back-
ground count rate. Beam port H-1 of the GTRR was chosen for high neutron 
flux as well as for beam diameter to allow greater separation of the beam 
and the detector assembly. 
Samples of pure metallic uranium and plutonium were activated in a 
thermal neutron beam, moved to an epithermal, delayed-neutron detector 
and counted, then moved back to the beam for reactivation. Each step, 
activation, move, count, move, was a fixed percentage of the total cycle 
time for varying cycle times. Uranium and plutonium each generate a 
characteristic decay time spectrum, or signature, of delayed neutrons 
counted as a function of the period of activation; the composition of a 
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Figure 6. Schematic of Experiment Setup at Beam Port H-1 Ln 
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mixed sample can be inferred from its delayed neutron activity as a func-
tion of cycle frequency, as described in Chapter III. 
The equipment and instrumentation necessary to perform this type of 
assay can conveniently be considered in the following four categories: 
1. the neutron source 
2. the cycle generator 
3. the delayed neutron detector 
4. signal processing and count accumulation electronic equipment. 
Figure 6 shows the overall arrangement of the equipment and instru-
mentation used in the execution of this experiment. Thermal neutrons, 
produced in the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, streamed from the reactor 
at horizontal port, H-l, through the region where interrogation of the 
samples took place, and into a beam catcher. The sample to be assayed, 
consisting of small disks in this experiment, was mounted on the end of a 
bar 410 mm in length. The bar, driven by a motor in the cycle generator, 
moved the sample in a circular path, first through the neutron beam and 
then into the detector assembly where the exothermal delayed neutrons, 
arising from fission events that took place while the sample was in the 
neutron beam, were moderated, and detected in BF detectors. In addition 
to the moderating material and the BF tubes the detector assembly in-
cluded adequate shielding to reduce the fast and thermal neutron back-
ground that existed near H-l to an acceptable level. Delayed neutron 
count pulses, generated by the BF tubes, were amplified in a preampli-
fier near the detector assembly. Three BF tubes were used at various 
angles around the sample. Delayed neutron pulses from the three preampli-
fiers were added together, further amplified, routed through a discrimina-
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tor to remove gamma pulses and background noise, and accumulated in a sca-
ler. The scaler was gated on by a timer pulse and a signal from the perio 
generator that indicated that the sample was in the detector. Thereby, 
an accumulation of background counts was avoided while the sample was 
being interrogated or was in transit from the neutron beam to the detec-
tor and back. The same timer that was used to gate the delayed neutron 
count scaler also gated a second "time free" scaler that collected pulses 
generated by the cycle generator. Two hundred and sixty pulses were gen-
erated by the cycle generator during every revolution of the sample bar; 
by using a known timer output, the period of sample revolution could be 
computed from these counts. 
The Neutron Source 
The choice of a neutron source for a fuel assay system is subject 
to several parameters. For quantitative assay of samples thicker than a 
millimeter or so, or for qualitative assay of inhomogeneous, thick sam-
ples, fast neutrons are necessary for sufficient penetration so that the 
entire sample volume participates in the assay. For samples that are 
neutronically thin or for qualitative assay of samples where homogeneity 
is assured, a thermal neutron source offers some advantages. Neutrons 
in a thermal flux are below the fission threshold of fertile materials, 
such as uranium-238 and plutonium-240. Flux tailoring devices, modera-
tors, filters and reflectors, needed with fast neutron sources to prevent 
fertile materials from participating in the assay, are not necessary when 
using thermal neutrons. The high cross sections for thermal neutrons re-
sponsible for self-shielding problems produce, as an advantage, also 
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better statistics, hence better accuracies, for a given interrogating 
flux. One of the best sources of thermal neutrons for interrogation, a 
nuclear reactor, is not portable, but it may often be found at a site 
where nuclear materials are assayed. Compared to other sources of neu-
trons, reactors produce high neutron fluxes and are inexpensive when the 
neutrons produced by the reactor are a by-product of some other primary 
function, such as the production of electrical power. 
Development of the mathematical model in Chapter III did not pre-
sume a specific source of interrogating neutrons. Any source that could 
be pulsed would suffice except that, in a fast neutron assay, fertile ma-
terial would participate, if it were present in the sample. In the ex-
periments, thermal neutrons were chosen for the interrogating beam because 
relatively high fluxes were readily available from the Georgia Tech Re-
search Reactor (GTRR). 
The Georgia Tech Research Reactor 
The GTRR is a CP-5 type heavy-water-moderated-and-cooled reactor. 
Fuel loading is approximately 2125 kilograms of uranium, 93 percent en-
riched uranium-235, in the form of uranium-aluminum alloy plates. Up to 
nineteen assemblies of these plates arranged in a hexagonal array, com-
prise the cylindrical core, which is roughly 60 centimeters in diameter 
and 60 centimeters high. The core is surrounded radially by a 60 centi-
meter thick D O moderator, a 60 centimeter graphite reflector, and about 
a meter and a quarter of high density concrete and lead for biological 
shielding. When this experiment was performed the reactor power level 
was 1000 kilowatts thermal and it produced a peak thermal neutron flux 
-l o o on 
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Figure 7. Mid-plane Section of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor 
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zontal section of the GTRR. 
The Beam Port 
For background considerations it was desirable to locate the de-
tector as far from the beam port as possible. However, the percentage of 
a cycle that the sample spends in the interrogation flux is controlled by 
beam diameter, as shown in Figure 4. Efficiency for detecting delayed 
neutrons is, in turn, affected by the fraction of a cycle spent in acti-
vation. These two considerations suggest that the beam port chosen as a 
source of interrogation neutrons has a large diameter. In order to com-
pile data rapidly it is also desirable to have a high thermal flux. Beam 
port H-l meets these qualifications; and since H-l was available for use 
when the experiment was initiated, it was chosen as the source of inter-
rogation neutrons. 
Beam port H-l is circular with a diameter of six inches. As shown 
in Figure 7, H-l originates in a high flux region of the GTRR near a fuel 
I O O 
element. A thermal flux or more than 10 n/cm /sec had been measured at 
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the reactor end of H-l and a fast neutron flux component can be expected 
from the proximity of a fuel element. Between the reactor end of H-l and 
the H-l shutter, graphite stringers moderate the fast component of the 
flux, provide some gamma shielding, and decrease the thermal flux by 
scattering. 
A beam plug was designed for beam port H-l to allow a well defined 
beam of neutrons to exit the reactor while preventing excess neutrons and 
gamma rays from entering the experiment area and raising the counting 
background. Details of the plug are shown in Figure 8. The plug has a 
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high density concrete, and boric acid in a matrix of polyester resin. A 
collimator of boric acid and polyester resin was inserted to produce a 
sharply defined neutron beam with a diameter of six inches (15 cm). Even 
though a well-defined neutron beam is needed to predict the delayed neu-
tron response after interrogation, sharp definition of the beam is not as 
important in the actual experiment because assay of unknown samples is 
accomplished by comparison with reference delayed neutron signatures of 
uranium-235 and plutonium-239 obtained with the same experimental set-up. 
Step construction was utilized in the plug to reduce streaming of unwanted 
gamma and neutron radiation outside the beam. Center beam thermal neutron 
o o 
flux was measured by indium foil activation to be about 5 x 10 n/cm /sec 
at the reactor face and the beam center. 
Defects in the reactor shielding in the vicinity of H-l resulted 
in some fast neutron leaks of moderate intensity. Shielding provided 
around the BF detectors in the experiment was not sufficient to eliminate 
the contribution of these leaks to the background count, so some additional 
shielding of paraffin slabs and cadmium sheets was added next to the reac-
tor biological shielding wherever fast neutron leaks were found. The most 
serious leak of fast neutrons came from a crescent-shaped void in the bio-
logical shield directly below H-l. When paraffin and cadmium shielding 
were applied in this area, background was reduced substantially. 
After passing through the experimental system, the neutron and 
gamma radiation beam from H-l terminated in a beam catcher. The beam 
catcher was constructed by G. H. Weaver and D. S. Bridges; it consisted 
of a 55 gallon steel drum filled with a mixture of paraffin, boric acid, 
and lead shot. 
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The Cycle Generator 
In this experiment an intermittent activation-count cycle was 
produced by physically moving the sample through a neutron beam, then into 
the detector, back through the beam, et cetera. The collection of foils 
comprising the sample rode the sample arm as it was rotated by an elec-
tric motor and gear train. This arrangement is depicted in Figure 9, a 
photograph of the system as it was operated. 
Because the cycle time is a crucial parameter in the final analy-
sis of data, it is important that the rotation period be very stable and 
reproducible. A linear servo-amplifier with negative feedback was used 
in the motor speed control used in this experiment. The speed control 
drives a 24 V, series-wound, DC motor and incorporates a tachometer feed-
back from the gear train to eliminate cycle time inaccuracies that could 
result from minor variations in load, such as bearing aging or thermal 
expansion of the gears. Silicon-controlled rectifier devices were avoided 
to exclude the possibility that the pulses they produce and the high fre-
quency noise generated by the switching transients of SCR's would disrupt 
some other electronic equipment in the system. In order to optimize sta-
bility of the cycle time over the wide range needed, front panel controls 
for feedback, open loop gain, and threshold were provided. Long and short 
term stability over the range of periods of interest, 0.1 to 150.0 sec, 
was found to be better than ±0.2 percent. 
The sample arm was driven by the speed controlled motor through a 
train of speed reducing gears with an overall ratio of 30/254 or about 1 
to 39.8. The gear ratio between the tachometer and motor was 17/20 or 
about 1 to 1.178. A photograph of the gear train is shown in Figure 10. 
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Figure 9. Photograph of Assembled Detector, Motor, and 
Gear Train 
Figure 10. Photograph Showing Motor and Gear Train Used to Drive the Sample Arm LO 
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Rather than take the analog output of the tachometer as an indi-
cation of instantaneous time, a more direct method of counting the number 
of revolutions in a given time was used to eliminate the necessity of 
developing a linear amplifier for the output of the tachometer, which, 
itself, is of dubious linearity (in this speed control, monotonicity, 
rather than linearity, is the important quality); it also allowed digital 
accumulation of data indicative of period time. To this end thirty small 
holes were drilled near the perimeter of a gear that turns with a ratio 
of 26/3 with the sample arm. The passage of these holes was detected 
with a General Electric H-11B interruptable light-coupled device, con-
sisting of a light sensitive transistor and an infrared light emitting 
diode coupled through a small air gap. A scaler, gated by a timer, accum-
ulated the pulses generated by the passage of holes through the light-
coupled device. In one revolution of the sample arm 260 pulses were de-
tected, so the number of revolutions (cycles) in a given time, controlled 
by the timer, could be determined with a maximum error of 0.0039 revolu-
tion. 
A fiberboard target attached to the shaft holding the sample arm 
interrupted the light beam in a second H-11B whenever the sample was not 
in the detector. The output of this device was coupled through an "AND" 
gate with the timer output and used to gate the scaler that accumulated 
delayed neutron pulses from the BF3 tubes. This method of gating pre-
vented the unnecessary accumulation of prompt neutrons as background 
while the sample was out of the detector and in the neutron beam. 
The sample arm was a flat piece of 3/16 inch by 3/8 inch aluminum 
stock drilled and tapped in the center and threaded onto the output shaft 
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of the gear train. Doublesided tape, applied to one end of the sample 
arm, was used to hold the sample during the experiment. 
Neutron Detector 
The neutron detector in this experiment needed to have as large an 
efficiency for detecting epithermal delayed neutrons as possible and to 
be somewhat insensitive to the thermal neutron and gamma ray background. 
BF3 detectors were chosen for their efficiency and availability. Paraffin 
was added to moderate the delayed neutron spectrum somewhat to increase 
the sensitivity of the BF3 detectors, and the moderator was surrounded 
by cadmium to eliminate thermal neutrons while allowing delayed neutrons 
to penetrate. 
Figure 11 is a photograph of the partially assembled delayed-
neutron detectors and the shielding. A drawing of the detector-shield 
assembly is shown in Figure 12 for easier identification of the various 
shielding and moderating elements. 
Detection of the delayed neutrons was accomplished with three 
independent boron trifluoride-filled detectors. One of these detectors 
was a Reuter-Stokes model RSN-7A and the other two were LND model 2025. 
These two types of detectors are functionally and mechanically equiva-
lent. The detectors were 2.5 cm in diameter and had a length of about 
30 cm, 20.64 cm of which comprised the active volume. The fill gas was 
BF^, and the detectors were filled to a pressure of 400 torr. Factory 
information which accompanied the detectors is shown in Appendix A. 
Count versus anode voltage plots was obtained for the LND detec-
tors and these plots are included in Appendix A. The plateau found 
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Figure 12. Drawing of Detectors, Moderator, and Shield 
(Entire assembly, including sample slot, was 
sheathed in cadmium. Dimensions in inches.) 
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for the LND detectors and the curve supplied by the factory for the 
Reuter-Stokes detector were used to select an operating voltage of 1275 
volts. All three of the detectors showed flat plateaus from 1200 volts 
to 1350 volts. 
The arrangement of the shield and moderator surrounding the detec-
tors can be seen in Figures 11 and 12. Each detector was enclosed in a 
paraffin moderator to render the epithermal delayed neutrons more detec-
table by reducing their energy. The paraffin moderator was enclosed on 
three sides by a cast cylindrical block of boric acid in a matrix of 
polyester resin. The cylinder supplied support for the moderator-detector 
assemblies. And, because it was formed from a neutron moderator, poly-
ester resin, and a neutron absorber, boric acid, the cylinder also shielded 
the detectors from any ambient background of thermal and epithermal neu-
trons. The reactor gamma ray background was not sufficiently intense to 
cause pile up and spurious counts in the BF~ detectors. The four sides 
of the moderator blocks form the detection volume. This arrangement was 
chosen to give the counting chamber as near 4TT geometry as possible with 
detectors that are long and thin. The counting chamber itself was lined 
with 0.5 mm of cadmium metal to shield against any thermal neutrons that 
might stream in through the slot for handling samples. Epithermal de-
layed neutrons easily penetrate the cadmium lining. Further shielding 
was provided by lining the sample handling slot with cadmium and covering 
the outer surface of the boric acid-polyester resin cylinder with 0.5 mm 
cadmium sheet. 
BF~ detectors discriminate well against gamma radiation such as 
that generated by the samples, relatively free of fission products, used 
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in this experiment. In assay situations involving spent fuel, very high 
gamma radiation fluxes may be encountered, and gamma pulse overlap in 
intense gamma fields may add significantly to the neutron count. When 
intense gamma fields are expected, the counting chamber may be shielded 
with a material, such as lead or bismuth, that is a good gamma shield, 
• -, 40 A i 
yet is relatively transparent to neutrons. A later section on calibra-
tion describes an experiment to determine the gamma radiation sensitivity 
of the BFo detectors used in the experiment and to define the gamma radia-
tion levels at which further lead shielding would have been necessary in 
this experiment. 
Background radiation is a factor in counting statistics that was 
somewhat controllable. Boric acid in polyester resin and cadmium sheet 
shielding at the detectors and paraffin and cadmium shielding at leaky 
places in the reactor biological shielding reduced the background en-
countered in these experiments to a few counts per second. This was still 
a substantial contribution to the total counts at long cycle times, long 
delayed-neutron precursor half lives, but was not a significant effect at 
cycle times of three and ten seconds, where the differences in delayed neu 
tron yields of uranium-235 and plutonium-239 are greatest. Further reduc-
tions in background are possible (Ralph Altman was able to achieve a back-
ground of one count per minute in a similar BF detector at beam port H-9) 
but that would not have resulted in much improvement in assay accuracy. 
Signal Processing and Count Accumulation 
Figure 13, is a schematic of the signal processing equipment. This 
equipment had the function of recording both the delayed neutron pulses 
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Figure 13. Schematic Diagram of the Signal Processing and Recording Equipment 
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generated by the BF detectors per unit time and the period of the acti-
vation cycle. 
The three BF neutron detectors were supplied with high voltage by 
a Hamner model N-4035 high voltage power supply. The high voltage was 
filtered by an R-C ladder network, 470 kO resistors and 0.1 p,F capacitors, 
before reaching the preamplifiers and detectors to prevent damage to the 
field effect transistors in the preamplifier inputs from a power-up or 
power-down transient. 
Pulses produced by the three neutron detectors were amplified by 
Hewlett-Packard model HP-5554A preamplifiers, one preamplifier for each 
BF detector. The internal bias resistor in each detector was 100 MO. 
Charge sensitivity was set at 300 |aC/V and voltage gain was set at 8. 
The signals from the preamplifiers were added by an RC network, 
shown in Figure 13, and the combined signal from the three outputs was fed 
into a Nuclear Data model ND-520 pad. Coarse voltage gain of the pad was 
set at 4 and the fine voltage gain was set to about mid-scale. 
Discrimination against noise and signals, other than those that 
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resulted from B (n,a)Li reactions in the BF detectors, was accomplished 
by a Hamner discriminator, model NC-10. 
The output of the discriminator was applied to an Ortec Model 400 
scaler to accumulate a count from the (n ,<y) events that occurred in the 
detectors. The scaler was set up to count positive-going pulses of about 
five volts in amplitude. The slave switch was set to normal and the 
gate was set on. 
Light pulses from the optical cycle time hole detectors were ap-
plied through a resistor-capacitor network shown in Figure 13 to another 
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Ortec Model 400 scaler. This scaler was set up to record negative-going 
pulses of about three volts amplitude. The slave switch was set on 
"normal" and the gate switch set to ON. 
Both scalers were gated by a timer built around a Signetics NE555V 
integrated circuit, also, as shown in Figure 13. The timer could be 
initiated by either a front panel push button or a remote push button lo-
cated on top of the reactor near the H-l shutter control. A front panel 
switch allowed time constants of 1, 10, 100, 1000, and 2000 seconds to 
be selected. 
The scaler used for accumulation of cycle time data (passage of 
holes) was gated directly by the timer but, in order to prevent accumula-
tion of background and prompt neutron pulses while the sample was out of the 
detector assembly, the count accumulation scaler was gated by the outputs 
of the timer and the optical coupler that indicated the sample was in 
position to count delayed neutrons. The output of the optical coupler was 
about 10 volts when the sample was in the detector and zero volts while 
the sample was out of the detector. Two transistors and two diodes con-
figured in a DTL AND gate, shown in Figure 13, were used to gate the 
count accumulation scaler from the timer and optocoupler outputs. 
Calibration 
Timer 
Since the timer was constructed from integrated circuits using 
formulas given in the Signetics Data Book to set up the resistor-capacitor 
timing networks, both accuracy and precision had to be checked. Actually, 
it was not necessary to know the actual time resulting from each of the 
five timer settings, but, rather, the ratio of the times to one another 
and the error between one time event and the next for each setting, be-
cause the data of interest were a series of time spectra, each taken 
using the same timer, rather than the absolute half lives of the various 
delayed neutron groups. The timer was used to time data collection and 
to determine the time required for one cycle. Activate, count, and 
transport portions of the cycle were mechanically held to fixed fractions 
of the total cycle time. 
To calibrate the timer and test its timing interval error the 
circuit shown in Figure 14 was set up on a breadboard. The circuit con-
sists of a 100 kHz crystal oscillator driving a Schmitt trigger for pulse 
shaping, followed by four TTL decade counters. An astable multivibrator 
2 3 
can be driven by any one of the four counters to provide 10, 10 , 10 , 
4 
or 10 pulses per second. The output of the multivibrator drove the 
signal input of one of the Ortec scalers used in the experiment while the 
timer to be calibrated was connected to the gate input. The multivibrator 
was connected to the proper decade counter to accumulate approximately 
4 
10 pulses in the time interval expected, based on the integrated circuit 
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manufacturer's formulas. For each timer setting, the scaler was cleared 
and the timer started a number of times to collect a series of timer in-
terval data. From these data the mean time interval and the standard de-
viation in the series of time intervals were calculated for each setting. 
The results of this calibration are presented in Table 4. Rather than 
try to trim the time intervals exactly to 1, 10, 100, 1000, and 2000 
seconds by varying circuit components, each experimental measurement was 
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Figure 14. Schematic of the Circuit Used to Calibrate 
the Tinier 
calculated counts per unit time using the information in Table 4 
Table 4. Timer Settings and Accuracies 
Timer Time St andard 
Setting Interval Deviation 
(sec) (%) 
A 1.129 0.3 
B 12.37 0.3 
C 115.4 0.3 
D 1031.0 0.2 
E 2206.0 0.3 
Motor Speed Control 
The speed control was tested for stability using the crystal 
oscillator constructed to test the timer. Pulses from the optical coupler 
generated by holes in the perimeter of one of the drive gears (260 pulses 
per revolution) were applied to one scaler and the output of the crystal 
oscillator-counter circuit was applied to a second scaler. Both scalers 
were gated by the timer. Since the number of pulses per second from the 
oscillator-counter circuit was known very precisely and accurately, the 
actual revolution time could be determined independent of any error in-
troduced by possible inaccuracies in the timer. 
The accuracy of the speed control was tested at cycle times of 
approximately 1, 100, and 1000 seconds. The number of counts in the 
scaler connected to the crystal controlled oscillator was divided by the 
number of counts per second from the oscillator to determine the time, 
and the count from the scaler connected to the speed control was divided 
by 260 to determine the number of revolutions. Data were collected at 
three time intervals to determine both the long term and short term 
stability of the speed control. 
Table 5 shows some typical speed settings and the corresponding 
long term and short term stability from one time interval to the next. 
In every case the la stability is better than one percent. 
Table 5. Accuracy of the Motor Speed Control 
Revolution a %  
Time 
(sec) (1 sec) (100 sec) (1000 sec) 
0.1 0.3 0.4 
1.0 0.5 0.4 
10 0.4 0.6 
100 0.6 0.9 
It was found, however, that a 15 minute warm up was necessary before 
stable operation was achieved. The speed control demonstrated some fine 
"hunting" at very long periods. This causes noisy operation but had 
little effect on stability in time periods even as short as one second. 
Gain and threshold controls were added to the speed control circuitry 
to eliminate the hunting but little further improvement in stability was 
obtained, even when hunting was eliminated. 
Neutron Beam Flux Determination 
The neutron beam emerging from beam port H-1 with the shutter open 
and the reactor operating at one megawatt was measured with an indium 
foil with a mass of 79 mg and a diameter of 1 cm. The foil was irradiated 
in the H-1 beam at the reactor face and, after an hour cooling off time 
to let the 2 and 14 second half-life activities die away, its 54.1 minute 
half-life beta activity was counted with a gas flow counter. Saturation 
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activity was found with the formula : 
A = X(C-B) 
s -\t -Xt -\t 
F e (1-e )(e -e
 Z) 
where 
A is saturation activity 
s 
i i r- 116m T 
X is the decay constant of In 
s is the overall detector efficiency for beta rays 
(C-B) is counts minus background 
t is the irradiation time 
r 
t1 is the time from the end of irradiation to the beginning of 
the count 
t„ is the time from the end of irradiation to the end of count 
F is the fraction of neutrons absorbed that contributes to A 
s 
In a neutron beam the saturation activity is related to beam thermal 
neutron flux by: 
As = a „th(l-e ) 
where 
A is saturation activity 
s J 
a is foil area 
cp is the thermal neutron beam flux 
d is foil thickness 
Z , is the macroscopic absorption cross section 
ath r r 
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The neutron flux from H-l at one megawatt at the reactor face was found 
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to be about 5 x 10 neutrons per cm per second. In a similar experi-
ment with cadmium covers it was determined that the cadmium ratio for 
indium foils was six. 
Dead Time Determination 
An attempt was made to determine the dead time of the BF detec-
tors used in the delayed neutron detector system, using a PuBe neutron 
source as a point source and assuming that the neutron flux in the air 
around the source decreased as the square of the distance from the source. 
It was established that the dead time was less than 50 (is, not enough to 
affect the low count rates encountered in the delayed neutron experiment. 
Gamma Sensitivity 
To be assured that counts resulting from gamma pileup in the BF_ 
detectors were not influencing the results of this experiment the detec-
tors were tested for gamma sensitivity with a 60 kilocurie cobalt source 
in the fuel storage pool. The counting equipment was set up at the edge 
of the pool, and gain and discriminator levels were set to the values 
used in the delayed neutron experiment. Thermoluminescent dosimeters 
were attached to a BF_ detector and the detector was lowered on a glass 
fiber string down an aluminum pipe toward the cobalt source. The detec-
tor was stopped at a given level, the count rate recorded, and the detec-
tor was raised to retrieve the TLD. This process was repeated for several 
different levels down the pipe. 
Figure 15 is a plot of the count rate induced in the BF_ detectors 
as a function of radiation field from the cobalt-60 source. In the de-
layed neutron experiment the gamma radiation level encountered by the BF 
100 150 
GAMMA-RAY DOSE (R/HR) 
200 
60, 
Figure 15. Sensitivity of BF Neutron Detectors to Garama-Ray Radiation from Co 
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detectors, less than 100 mR per hour, was not sufficient to perturb the 
count rate. At 30 R per hour, gamma induced counts would have presented 
a serious background problem, and at 150 R per hour the count rate from 
gamma radiation would have approached the count rate from delayed neu-
trons. Had it been necessary to contend with gamma fields of this mag-
nitude, from, for instance, spent fuel elements, a dense material with 
low neutron absorption cross section, such as bismuth or lead, would have 
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been used to shield the detectors from gamma rays. 
Description of the Samples 
For the present experiment the samples of fissionable material 
that were available consisted of a series of small uranium metal foils 
and five large, encapsulated plutonium foils. Sample size and shape 
will, of course, exert a considerable influence on the configuration of 
the assay experiment. Samples, for instance, that are massive or bulky 
would require fast, rather than thermal, neutrons to penetrate and assay 
more than just the outside few millimeters of material; and samples that 
are awkward to handle may require pulsing of the neutron source rather 
than physical movement of the sample. 
The uranium foils were discs of uranium metal 1.27 cm in diameter 
and about 0.02 mm thick. Table 6 lists the uranium foils available for 
the experiment with the mass of each foil. These foils were oxidized on 
the surface, so, to prevent loss of mass and contamination by uranium 
oxide around the experiment area, the foils were encapsulated in small 
polyethylene bags and sealed. The bags were weighed before and after 
inserting the uranium foils and the differences between the masses deter-
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Table 6. Fission Foils Used and Data Used to Determine 
Self-Shielding Factors for the Plutonium Foils 
U ranium-•235 



















1 (P-296) 38,813 0.152 
2 (P-297) 1.0 500 35,411 0.147 
3 (P-298) 1.0 500 37,095 0.150 
4 (P-299) 1.0 500 42,157 0.163 
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mined from the two weighings were used as the foil masses in these ex-
periments. The contribution of oxygen to these measurements was assumed 
to be negligible. The total weight of the polyethylene in an encapsu-
lating bag was found to be, typically, 0.06 gram. Wall thickness of the 
bags was 0.025 mm and the bag wall and foil were in contact in the ex-
perimental set up, so the polyethylene should not have detectably af-
fected the fissions per unit time in the sample or changed the number or 
spectrum of delayed neutrons reaching the BF detectors from the fission 
products in the sample. 
The plutonium used in the experiment consisted of five plutonium 
foils on hand at Georgia Tech. The plutonium was in the form of plutonium 
metal which, because plutonium metal is toxic and chemically reactive, was 
encapsulated in a stainless steel can with a wall thickness of 0.254 mm. 
The samples used contained about 1.0 gram of 99 percent pure plutonium-
239. 
Fissionable Material Safety 
In this experiment there were never more than five grams of fissile 
material, uranium-235 or plutonium-239, in use at any time. This amount 
of fissile material is not sufficient to form a critical mass in any 
physical configuration. The introduction of this much fissile material 
into the containment building is acceptable; the mass of fissile material, 
other than the material in the reactor core, is limited by the Georgia 
Tech Research Reactor (GTRR) operating specifications to five grams. 
Even though five grams of fissile material are not sufficient to 
form a critical mass, care had to be taken to prevent any fissile material 
from accidentally entering the reactor core. Beam port H-l was open during 
83 
the experiment but graphite stringers left between the shutter and the 
core would have prevented objects entering the face of the beam port from 
approaching the core. Samples were rotated around an axis perpendicular 
to the face of the reactor so, even if a fissionable sample had broken 
from the sample arm while being rotated, it could not have been thrown 
toward the reactor. Rotation speeds were not very great but calculations 
showed that at a maximum rotation rate of about 10 rps, a sample freed 
from the rotating arm at the proper time could have been thrown as high 
as the top of the biological shielding. It was considered unlikely that 
a sample of fissionable material thrown from the vertically moving arm 
would land on the top of the reactor rather than falling directly back 
down, or that the sample could penetrate the top shield plugs if it did 
find its way to the top of the reactor; but to prevent any possibility 
of such an occurrence the ends of the sample arm were drilled and taped 
for small set screws to prevent any radial movement of the sample on the 
arm. 
Ionizing Radiation 
Ionizing radiation encountered in this experiment arose from four 
sources: the inherent.activity of the fissionable material, the fission 
products produced by neutron irradiation of the samples, the prompt fis-
sion activity encountered during the course of the experiment, and radia-
tion from the reactor itself. 
Sample Activity. Before the experiment the neutron exposure his-
tory of the samples was very limited. The plutonium had not been previ-
ously subjected to neutron irradiation and only a few of the uranium 
foils had received any neutron irradiation, and those had had considerable 
84 
elapsed time for the fission product activity to die away. Thus the 
samples were relatively free of any induced activity prior to the experi-
ment. A calculation of the activity of the approximately one gram of 
uranium-235 that was on hand showed that it had an activity of consider-
ably less than one mCi. A similar calculation for plutonium-239 yielded 
about 10 mCi for a one gram sample. Radiation levels of about five mR/hr 
for the uranium and 100 mR/hr for the plutonium were measured at contact. 
The fresh samples, then, did not present much of a hazard. Even so, the 
fresh samples were always handled with forceps and stored in a properly 
labeled lead pig. 
Induced Activity. During a test as many as 10 fissions may have 
been induced, resulting in a sizeable fission product activity. Since 
most fission products have short half lives and since the maximum fission 
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rate in the samples was less than 10 fissions per second, the fission 
product activity did not build up as rapidly or as high as the first orde 
approximation from the total fissions induced might indicate. 
The hazard of fission product radiation was evaluated experiment-
ally to eliminate any calculational uncertainty. The experiment was set 
up and, with health physics in attendance, beam port H-1 was opened for 
about three seconds. After closing the shutter to H-1 the radiation 
level of the sample was monitored. This procedure was repeated leaving 
the shutter open for longer periods until irradiation times approximat-
ing the irradiation times to be encountered in the experiment were 
achieved. Because it was the most massive, the plutonium sample was the 
most active. It read 10 rad per hour at contact immediately after clos-
ing the shutter to H-1 after a 600 sec test period. The procedure during 
the experiment was to allow the samples to cool in the experiment area 
for 30 to 60 minutes after a run of the experiment, then the irradiated 
sample was removed from the sample arm with forceps and stored in a lead 
pig. Several samples, particularly the plutonium, received many irradi-
ations; therefore, fission product activity was monitored before and 
after a sample was used to be assured that the activity was not building 
up unacceptably. 
Reactor Beam Hazard. The most intense source of radiation in-
volved in the experiment was the reactor beam from H-l. The beam was 
stopped after traversing the experiment by the beam catcher. The two-
foot path traversed by the beam between the face of the reactor and the 
beam catcher was roped off and labeled a high radiation area when the 
shutter was open. The experiment controls and data collection electron-
ics were sufficiently remote from the beam to permit operation of the 
controls when the shutter was open, but, because no intervention was 
necessary while data were being collected, the shutter was usually closed 
before the area was approached to record data and make cycle time changes 
A remote switch allowed initiation of a data run from the top of the re-
actor after the shutter was opened. 
While the shutter was open, enough reactor and prompt fission 
radiation still by-passed the beam catcher to cause an alarm on the area 
monitor near the experiment. Health Physics ascertained that the radia-
tion levels outside the roped off area were not excessive. However, the 
"Do Not Enter Light" on the air lock was lit and anyone entering the con-
tainment building was advised of the situation. 
Prompt Fission. While a sample was in the neutron beam it was 
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experiencing as much as 10 fissions per second with a corresponding 
output of prompt gamma radiation. However, during the time that fissions 
were being produced in the sample, the sample was between the reactor 
biological shielding and the beam catcher, and, therefore, fairly well 
shielded from the floor of the containment vessel. Health Physics moni-
tored radiation levels near the beam and the fissioning sample when the 
experiment was begun, and the steps taken to limit exposure from the 
reactor beam supplied protection from the prompt fission activity as well. 
Toxic Materials 
Plutonium is one of the most toxic substances and plutonium metal 
is very active chemically; consequently care had to be taken that the 
plutonium metal samples, though hermetically sealed in 0.0125 inch thick 
stainless steel cans, did not leak. Health Physics took smears from the 
plutonium samples and the lead pig in which they were stored to check for 
possible dispersal of plutonium. None was found. 
The uranium metal foils used were oxidized on the surface and 
small flecks of the oxide could be removed mechanically. To prevent 
contamination by uranium oxide and to preserve the integrity of the foils, 
the uranium samples were sealed in small, thin polyethylene bags. The 
bags and the lead pig in which they were stored were tested by Health 
Physics to be assured that there was no dispersal of uranium. 
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CHAPTER V 
DATA COLLECTION AND RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENT 
To analyze a sample for composition of uranium-235 and plutonium-
239, the delayed neutron response of the sample as a function of activa-
tion cycle frequency was compared to similar responses from known stand-
ards with the aid of computer programs that will be described in Chapter 
VI. It was necessary to take a number of delayed neutron counts at vari-
ous frequencies for each sample to construct a delayed neutron count rate 
function for each sample for comparison to the similar function from a 
known standard sample. Each analysis was done with a delayed neutron 
count rate function consisting of delayed neutron count rates taken at 
25 to 50 different cycle periods, spaced approximately logarithmically 
between 0.1 second and 50 or 100 seconds. Various samples were con-
structed from the foils available to test the sensitivity and accuracy of 
this analysis method, and to test the ability of the method to distinguish 
between the fissile isotopes uranium-235 and plutonium-239. 
Once the experiment was set up, collection of data was very 
straightforward. The electronic systems were turned on and high voltage 
was set to 1250 volts. The timer was set to a cycle time of one second 
(actually 1.129 sec) and the speed controls were set to get about 2935 
counts in the revolution counting scaler. It was difficult to set the 
speed exactly, but on most data points is did not matter because the 
actual cycle period could be calculated from the counts in the revolution 
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counter. However, since the first point, 10 rps, was used as a normali-
zation point in the analysis, pains were taken to get this period as 
close to nominal as possible even though the delayed neutron signatures 
are very flat in this region. The beam shutter was opened and several 
minutes were allowed for equilibrium response to be reached. The data 
collection timer was set to 100 sec and delayed neutron counts were 
collected in one scaler each time the sample passed through the neutron 
detector. In a second scaler pulses from the optical coupler in the gear 
train were collected to compute the cycle time (inverse of cycle fre-
quency) for the data point. After the data in the two scalers had been 
recorded, the speed control was set for the next cycle time (calculated 
to give about 25 to 50 points logarithmically spaced on the resultant de-
layed neutron response as a function of cycle time curve) and the timer 
retriggered. By this time the short half-lived precursors had reached 
equilibrium and small changes in period would not affect the equilibrium 
response of the long half-lived delayed neutron precursors. This pro-
cedure was repeated until a period of about 100 seconds was reached. For 
longer periods a longer time was allowed between runs for transients to 
die away. The resulting set of delayed neutron count rates at various 
cycle periods described the cyclic activation response of the sample and 
was entered, along with the background count rate, into the Univac 1108 
programs described in Chapter VI. 
Data were collected in the manner described above for plutonium 
alone and for uranium alone for the analysis program for use as a refer-
ence. Then, a series of data runs was made for sample compositions of 
uranium-235 and plutonium-239 ratios varying from 10:90 to 60:40. 
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Because the plutonium foils available were about one gram in mass there 
was not sufficient uranium on hand to make up samples richer in uranium-
235 than about 60 percent. In this experiment the thermal neutrons used 
for interrogation were not able to uniformly penetrate the samples, and 
significant self-shielding effects, described in Chapter VI, had to be 
corrected for in the relationships between delayed neutron response and 
the actual mass of fissionable isotope present. The thickness of the 
plutonium foils was not measurable because the foils were sealed in 
stainless steel capsules for safety reasons. Of the 1.5 mm thickness of 
the capsule, probably at least 1.0 mm was plutonium metal, equivalent to 
about five mean free path lengths for thermal neutrons. The thickness 
of the uranium foils was measured to be about 0.15 mm, a little less 
than 0.5 mean free path for thermal neutrons. 
Determination of the relationship between delayed neutron response 
and sample mass did not affect this isotopic analysis significantly be-
cause the samples were constructed of uranium foils and plutonium foils 
having similar self-shielding factors (foils were not stacked) and the 
analysis was in terms of standards having the same self-shielding factors 
It is of some interest, though, to assess the performance of this tech-
nique for thin or homogeneous samples, or for an interrogating source 
with greater penetrating ability than thermal neutrons, such as fast 
neutrons or high energy gamma rays. To assess the self-shielding effects 
of the thickness of the plutonium foils the short cycle time response 
(total delayed neutron response) of a 0.8665 gram foil of uranium-235 was 
measured and compared to each of the plutonium-239 foil short cycle time 
responses. Self-shielding factors were calculated for each plutonium 
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foil by the following equation: 
F = "P
 Nu h °fu vu 
n u N P Pp CTfP V P 
where 
F is the self-shielding factor of a plutonium foil relative to a 
uranium foil 
N is the number of atoms 
3 is the percentage of neutrons that is delayed 
a is the isotopic fission cross section 
v is the average number of prompt neutrons following fission 
n is the delayed neutron short period count rate 
P subscript is plutonium-239 
U subscript is uranium-235 
The factor so calculated is actually the ratio of self-shielding for the 
plutonium foil to the self-shielding factor for the uranium foil used for 
comparison. Since the foils were not stacked, using the uranium foil 
mass to normalize the uranium standard curve and the plutonium foil mass 
times this factor to normalize the plutonium standard curve should yield 
the same results as homogeneous mixtures of uranium-235 and plutonium-
239. Table 6 lists the plutonium foils used and the self-shielding fac-
tors found for them. 
To test the theory developed in Chapter III and to evaluate this 
assay method for safeguards applications, a series of runs was made under 
similar conditions (count time, number of data points, etc.) with varying 
quantities of fissionable material and isotopic ratios. Table 7 lists 
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Table 7. Samples Constructed with the Foils Available 
Run Sample Make Up No. of Counts at 
No. Pu Foils of 
U Foils 
Points 0.1 Sec 
Cycle Time 
1 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4,5 50 66529 
2 1,2,3 all 50 62798 
3 1,2 all 48 60015 
4 1 all 50 56954 
5 all 1,2,3,4 49 55461 
6 1,2,3 1,2,3,4 50 52166 
7 1,2 1,2,3,4 50 48995 
8 1 1,2,3,4 50 46010 
9 all 1,2,3 50 44580 
10 1,2,3 1,2,3 49 41223 
11 1,2 1,2,3 50 38114 
12 1 1,2,3 50 35067 
13 all 1,2 50 34197 
14 1,2,3 1,2 49 30839 
15 1,2 1,2 49 27720 
16 1 1,2 48 24684 
17 all 1 49 23192 
18 1,2,3 1 49 19834 
19 1,2 1 48 16725 
20 1 1 48 13678 
Note: The number of data points taken was distributed approximately 
logarithmically between 0.1 sec and 100 sec cycle times. Count 
times for each point were 100 sec. 
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these runs. In addition, two standards runs were made, one with all of 
the uranium-235 foils in place and one with all the plutonium-239 foils 
in place. These two runs contained 50 points each. The counts taken at 
cycle times of 0.1 second, indicating total delayed neutron response, 
were 65502 and 18391, respectively. 
Table 8 shows some longer run time data that were taken to test 
the error analysis developed in the next chapter. These runs consisted 
of 20 points each. Each point was counted for 500 seconds. No points 
were taken at cycle times longer than 50 seconds. The delayed neutrons 
Table 8. Samples Analyzed with 20 Data Points between 
0.1 Second and 50 Seconds Cycle Time 
Run Sample Make Up No. of Total Counts 
No. Pu Foils of Points for 0.1 Sec 
U Foils Cycle Time 
1 all all 20 332751 
2 1,2,3 all 20 313950 
3 1,2 all 20 300793 
4 1 all 20 284161 
were counted at each of the 20 different cycle times for 500 seconds, 
giving a total counting time of about two hours and 45 minutes per sample. 
To further test self-shielding of plutonium, two plutonium foils 
were stacked and delayed neutrons were counted at a cycle time of 0.1 sec. 
The count rate of two plutonium foils or of a plutonium foil covering a 
uranium foil was essentially the same as for one plutonium foil alone, 




ANALYSIS OF DATA 
Data collected in the delayed neutron experiments were loaded into 
Univac 1108 Fastran files and programs were written in Fortran IV to re-
duce these data and infer from them the concentration of plutonium-239 
and uranium-235 in the samples used. Calculational methods, described 
later, were used to obtain the ratio of plutonium-239 to uranium-235 in 
the samples from comparison of the delayed neutron response as a function 
of activation period signature for the unknown samples with delayed neu-
tron signature references obtained with samples containing only plutonium-
239 or uranium-235. Once this ratio was known, the total mass of 
plutonium-239 and uranium-235 could be estimated from the total (short 
cycle time) delayed neutron response. Programs were also written to 
check the fit of the experimental data to predicted results, which were 
obtained by using the six group abundances and effective half-lives found 
by Keepin for uranium-235 and plutonium-239. 
Data recorded during each experimental run were entered via a re-
mote terminal to a Fastran file on the Univac 1108 computer. A Fortran 
program named NCERT was used to insert cycle period, data count, and data 
count time as a file element into the scratch file. NCERT calculated the 
cycle period from the position of the timer switch, entered as a number 
1 to 5, and the number of photocell pulses recorded during that time inter 
val. NCERT included as a data statement the timer intervals shown in 
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Table 4. A second program, CLTUR, then subtracted background and nor-
malized the data to 1.0 for the period nearest to 0.103 second, stored 
the normalization factor as element 1, and the periods and corresponding 
normalized data as succeeding elements in the appropriate file. The data 
from each run occupied a separate file. The normalization period of 0.103 
second was chosen because it was the shortest period at which data were 
taken in the runs with the standards, "uranium-235 only" and "plutonium-
239 only." Figures 16 and 17 show that periods between 0.1 second and 
0.2 second are in a region of saturated response. Small variations of 
period in this range would have no effect on the normalization factor; so 
no attempt was made to interpolate a function for a point at 0.103 second 
when none existed; a point nearest the 0.103 second period, always less 
than 0.2 second, was chosen for normalization. 
Normalization of the delayed neutron data allows easy comparison 
of the shapes of curves from samples exhibiting different absolute levels 
of response. Higher long cycle time response implies a greater percent-
age of delayed neutrons have long half-lives. 
The normalization factor is the total response of delayed neutrons 
contributed by all the delayed neutron-emitting groups with half lives 
greater than about 0.1 second and, therefore, can be used as a measure of 
the total mass of fissioning material contributing to the delayed neutron 
response. 
Figures 18 and 19 are plots of normalized data as a function of 
cycle time for "uranium-235 only" and "plutonium-239 only" samples. Nor-
malized data as a function of cycle time for a 50:50 mixture of uranium-
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Figure 18. Normalized Delayed Neutron Count Rate vs Cycle 
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include, as a solid line, a curve generated with equation 3-28 using six 
delayed neutron precursors with the half-lives and abundances measured 
by Keepin. 
Even though good agreement of the data with curves predicted using 
Keepin's six delayed neutron groups was obtained, as seen in Figures 18, 
19, and 20, isotopic analysis of a sample was made using experimental 
standards rather than the theoretical curves. Use of a relative assay 
method using experimental standards run with the same experimental con-
figuration as the unknown samples eliminated problems that could have 
arisen from imprecise definition of experimental parameters, such as beam 
width or active region of the detector, and avoided inaccuracies arising 
in any deviation of actual delayed neutron response from six group theory. 
Figure 21 is a plot of the difference between a plutonium-239 de-
layed neutron signature with the short cycle time--saturation--response 
normalized to 1.0 and the similarly normalized response of uranium-235 
only and of two samples containing both uranium-235 and plutonium-239. A 
similar plot is shown in Figure 22 for differences between normalized sig-
natures of a uranium-235 standard and the signatures of plutonium-239 and 
of two samples of mixed composition. In Figure 5, two curves are shown 
which have similar short cycle time response but different half-lives 
generating the single break point. The activation product having the 
longer half-life will exhibit greater response at all cycle times except 
in the region of saturated response. Because plutonium-239 has a greater 
ratio of long to short half-life delayed neutrons than uranium-235, at 
periods between 0.1 second and 150 seconds, the normalized delayed neutron 
signatures of samples containing uranium-235 were, within statistical 
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Figure 21. Difference in Delayed Neutron Count Rate of Pu and Two Samples 
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deviations, less than or equal to the signature of plutonium-239 alone. 
Overlap of the curves occurs only at short periods, saturated response, 
and for long periods, where differences are lost in the statistics of 
small responses. Similarly, samples containing plutonium-239 always, in 
the range of periods of interest, yielded normalized curves that were 
greater than or equal to the normalized curve of uranium-235 alone. These 
differences should reflect the number of delayed neutrons contributed to 
the total delayed neutron response by each of the two fissioning nuclides 
in the sample and, through the normalization factors obtained by use of 
the standards, the mass of each fissioning isotope in the sample. Dif-
ferences between normalized curves, Figures 21 and 22, as a function of 
cycle time are indicative of the ratio of abundances of delayed neutrons, 
in the samples, that contribute to break points at, or greater than, the 
cycle time on the ordinate of the plot. 
A Fortran program named DELTAR was written to estimate the isotopic 
composition of a constructed sample by analyzing the differences between 
the sample's normalized delayed neutron signature and the signatures of 
the plutonium-239 and uranium-235 standards. A flow chart for DELTAR is 
depicted in Appendix B. The integrated area between the response vs log 
cycle time curves of the standards and samples is used by DELTAR as the 
difference between signatures. This area is generated by DELTAR as the 
sum of the areas of trapezoids bounded by measured points on the standard 
or sample signatures, and response values for the same period from the 
sample or standard curves, respectively. The ratio of the area thus ob-
tained between the sample curve and the uranium-235 standard curve to the 
area between the plutonium-239 and uranium-235 standard curves themselves 
is indicative of the ratio of the delayed neutrons contributed by 
plutonium-239 to the total number of delayed neutrons in the response. 
Likewise, the ratio of the area between the sample curve and the plutonium-
239 curve to the area between the standard curves represents the portion 
of the total delayed neutron response contributed by uranium-235. Once 
an estimate is made of the percentage of the delayed neutrons contributed 
to the response by each of the two fissioning nuclides the quantitative 
response of plutonium-239 and uranium-235 is calculated by multiplying 
the delayed neutron percentage by the normalization factor for the sample. 
From the normalization factors of the standards, values of delayed neu-
trons per gram of fissioning material were determined. These values are 
compared to the quantitative delayed neutron response from the samples to 
determine the mass of plutonium-239 and of uranium-235 in the sample. 
Table 9 shows a list of samples, their composition, the composition of 
each sample as determined by its delayed neutron response using DELTAR, 
and the percentage discrepancies between the known and assayed composi-
tion values. 
Error Analysis 
Experimental bias can be introduced into this assay from several 
sources, but accuracy seems to be limited primarily by statistics. Geom-
etry was unchanged for the duration of the experiment and the precision 
of the timer, on which count rate and frequency determination were based, 
was checked several times during the experiment. Any deviation in the 
power level of the reactor affected the delayed neutron count rate in the 
experiment. Data collected while the reactor power level was changed 
showed expected distortion and were discarded. All of the data used were 
Table 9. Data Collected to Estimate Uranium and Plutonium Content of Samples 
Described in Table 7 
Sample Uranium Plutonium U/Pu Derived Composition Derived Pro bable Deviation of 
(grams) Ratio (grams) U/Pu 0 (%) Derived ( Composition 
(including self-shielding) Ratio from Constructed 
Compos Ltion (%) 
Uranium Plutonium Uranium Plutonium Uranium Plutonium 
1 0.8665 0.612 1.4 0.880 0.562 1.6 2.5 10.6 + 1.5 - 8.1 
2 0.8665 0.449 1.9 0.881 0.505 1.7 2.6 14 + 1.7 + 12.5 
3 0.8665 0.297 2.9 0.880 0.350 2.5 2.0 18 + 1.5 + 18 
4 0.8665 0.150 5.8 0.856 0.126 6.7 1.3 24 -1.2 -16 
5 0.6904 0.612 1.1 0.704 0.567 1.2 2.9 9.7 + 2.0 - 7.3 
6 0.6904 0.449 1.5 0.673 0.411 1.6 2.9 13.2 -2.3 - 8.5 
7 0.6904 0.297 2.3 0.677 0.338 2.0 2.8 20 -2.0 + 14 
8 0.6904 0.150 4.6 '0.702 0.192 3.7 2.7 35 + 1.7 +28 
9 0.5149 0.612 0.84 0.499 0.645 0.78 3.4 8.7 -3.0 + 5.4 
10 0.5149 0.449 1.1 0.528 0.386 1.4 3.3 11 +2.5 -14 
11 0.5149 0.297 1.7 0.525 0.261 2.0 3.0 17 + 1.9 -12 
12 0.5149 0.150 3.4 0.499 0.192 2.6 3.1 31 -3.0 +28 
13 0.3478 0.612 0.57 0.363 0.640 0.57 4.2 7.2 +4.3 + 4.6 
14 0.3478 0.449 0.77 0.342 0.411 0.83 4.2 9.8 -1.8 - 8.5 
15 0.3478 0.297 1.2 0.337 0.263 1.3 4.1 14 -3.0 -11.5 
16 0.3478 0.150 2.3 0.337 0.199 1.7 3.9 28 -3.0 +33 
17 0.1707 0.612 0.28 0.183 0.587 0.31 6.8 5.8 +7.2 - 4.0 
18 0.1707 0.449 0.38 0.178 0.468 0.38 6.5 7.5 +4.3 + 4.2 
19 0.1707 0.297 0.57 0.162 0.326 0.50 5.9 10.5 -5.2 + 9.8 
20 0.1707 0.150 1.1 0.172 0.183 0.94 5.8 20 +1.4 +22 
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collected with the reactor operating at 1000 kW and with the power level 
under automatic control. Variations in power level resulting from reac-
tor regulator rod action do not seem to have caused inaccuracies that are 
significant in comparison to the statistical precision obtainable. 
Dead time measurements were described in the calibration section. 
At the count rates encountered in this experiment, around 10,000 cps 
maximum, dead time effects in the detectors were small. Dead time of the 
detectors dominated the system dead time. 
Steady-state gamma-induced background was very small, limited both 
by the BF„ detector's inherent discrimination against gamma rays and by 
the neutron shielding around the detectors. Steady-state neutron back-
ground was, potentially, a much larger problem, and was controlled at a 
few cpm by keeping the detectors as far as possible from the beam of in-
terrogation neutrons, keeping the beam as short as possible, and by shield-
ing the detectors with paraffin, cadmium, and boric acid in a polyester 
matrix. The neutron background was somewhat dependent on the activity of 
nearby experiments. Background measurements were made any time there was 
reason to believe the background level might have changed. Background 
was also reduced by counting only when the samples were in the active 
region of the detector assembly. 
As seen in the section on calibration, the gamma activity of the 
samples was not great enough to introduce error or bias in the results of 
the experiment. Samples capable of exposing the detectors to a gamma 
dose rate of 30 R/hr would have disturbed the results; however, the sam-
ples used in this experiment caused a detector gamma dose of less than 
100 mR/hr. 
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Counting statistics play the major role in the accuracy to which 
an assay can be made. All of the assays reported in Table 8 were made 
with the same count time per period, 100 seconds; and each sample was 
analyzed with the same number of periods, fifty, spaced approximately 
logarithmically from short to long periods. About 1.5 hours were needed 
to make each run. In the preceding analysis the isotopic percentage of 
uranium-235 or plutonium-239 was obtained as a normalization factor 
times ratio of the area between normalized count rate vs period curves 
and a standard curve. The area between the curves was estimated by 
summing the areas of trapezoids whose bases were terminated by the nor-
malized count rates of the two curves, and whose heights were the dif-
ferences between log periods at which observations were made. 
A = l/2[(a-b) + (c-d)]AP (6-1) 
where 
A is area 
a and c are count rates on one curve 
b and d are count rates on the other curve 
Ap is the difference in log periods at which counts are 
made 
Some of the count rates, a, b, c and d, were interpolated. However, the 
interpolated points were on a slowly varying function between points that 
were not very different, so the standard deviation in the interpolated 
points was similar to the points from which it was generated, approxi-
mately the square root of the count rate. The standard deviation of the 
average of the bases of a trapezoid can be found using the formula 
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o = ( r - ) a + 7~) a + . . . (6-2) 
x \ b u / u \ b v / v 
to be 
2 1 , 2 2 2 2 , „ ^ 
CTL = 4 ( aa + ab + ac + ad} ( 6 _ 3 ) 
Similarly the standard deviation of the area of a trapezoid is 
aA = P aT + L a , (6-4) 
or 
2 2 2 
°A G L CTp rA ^ 
72 = 72 + ^ ( 6 " 5 ) 
A L P 
2 2 
°P aL 
—— is small by several orders of magnitude compared to — and can be dis-
C J-i 
regarded. The total area between curves is the sum of the areas of all 
the trapezoids, and the square of the standard deviation of the total 
area is the sum of the squares of the standard deviations of the areas 
of the trapezoids. 
2 2 2 2 
at = 2 a{ = Z Po (6-6) 
area A L 
The quantity of fissioning isotope is found from a constant times the 
ratio of the area between the normalized curve and a standard curve and 
the area between the standard curves for uranium-235 and plutonium-239. 
The precision to which this quantity can be determined is 
2 2 2 
q area 1 area Z 
2 ~ 2 + 2 
q (area 1) (area 2) 
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Table 9 includes a column which indicates the precision expected in each 
assay. 
Figure 23 shows the assay accuracy in percent, at the 67 percent 
confidence level, against the percentage make-up of about one gram of 
material. Data for this plot were taken from Table 8. Figures 24 and 
25 show the accuracy of the analysis of uranium in the presence of 0.15 
gram plutonium and 0.618 gram plutonium, respectively. Figures 26 and 
27, similarly, show the plutonium analysis in the presence of 0.1707 
gram and 0.8665 gram uranium. Data points in these figures are taken 
from Table 9. The solid lines have a one to one slope, indicating per-
fect correspondence between measured value and the actual components of 
the sample. Agreement between the data points and solid line indicates 
the good linearity of the method. Scatter of the points shows decreased 
accuracy for smaller samples and for increased percentages of interfer-
ing fissioning isotopes, uranium-235 in the assay of plutonium-239 and 
plutonium-239 in the assay of uranium-235. As expected, errors tend to 
be proportional to the square root of the delayed neutron response. 
Increased count rates or longer count times improve statistics. 
Sample 5 was counted for twice the time as the run listed in Table 9 with 
the result, after analysis with DELTAR, that the uranium assay was 1.3 
percent over the expected value and the plutonium assay was 4.0 percent 
over. As expected from the error analysis, the errors were multiplied 
by a factor of about 0.7. 
Very-Short-Half-Life Delayed Neutrons 
Delayed neutrons following a fission with half-lives shorter than 
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Figure 25. Analysis of U in the Presence of 0.612 gm Pu 
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Figure 26. Analysis of Pu in the Presence of 0.1707 gm U 





















Figure 27. Analysis of Pu in the Presence of 0.8665 gm U 
(Points are samples 4, 3, 2, and 1 from Table 9.) 
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about 0.2 second have not been reported in the literature, nor are they 
expected on theoretical grounds. Beta transitions leading to a nuclide 
sufficiently excited to emit a neutron are hindered for half-lives shorter 
than about 0.2 second. Even though these short half-lived delayed neu-
trons were not expected, the ease with which some half-lives could be de-
duced from the available data prompted an analysis. The background counts 
associated with uranium-235 only and plutonium-239 only test runs were 
subtracted from the appropriate sets of data on Fastran files and the 
experimental data points for cycle times shorter than 1.0 second are 
plotted for uranium in Figure 16 and for plutonium in Figure 17. The 
theoretical delayed neutron curve, generated from equation 3-28 using 
Keepin' s six delayed neutron abundances and half-lives is plotted as a 
solid line for uranium-235 and plutonium-239 in Figures 16 and 17, re-
spectively. One standard deviation for the experimental points is less 
than 1.0 percent for both uranium and plutonium. 
For the beam width, wait times, and detector aperture used, the 
0.2 second half-life delayed neutron group was responsible for a break 
from the level saturation curve near 0.5 second period, in Figures 16 
and 17, as predicted by theory. Delayed neutrons with half-lives shorter 
than the 0.2 second half life group would shift the break in the direc-
tion of shorter periods. If there were any delayed neutron groups with 
half-lives less than 0.05 second, the response curve would shift and the 
break point would occur at periods shorter than those observed. The 
dotted line in Figure 15 shows the curve expected with a delayed neutron 
group with a half-life of 0.05 sec and abundance of 0.04 present. Very 
short delayed neutron groups, and, of course, prompt neutrons, die away 
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completely before reaching the detector at the sample speeds used in this 
experiment. 
Besides statistical uncertainty, discrepancies between theory and 
experimental data can arise from two sources; uncertainties in the delayed 
neutron parameters used to generate the theoretical curve, errors in period 
determination, which could appear to shift the break point, and non-
uniformity of the beam and errors in determining the fractions of a 
period for activation, decay, and detection, which could affect both 
break point period and curve shape. 
In the generation of the theoretical curve a single half-life (the 
shortest group half-life) of 0.230 second for uranium-235 and 0.257 second 
for plutonium-239 were assumed for the shortest lived group. These half-
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lives were statistically derived by Keepin and, in reality, the sixth 
delayed neutron group probably has several discrete contributors with 
different half-lives. Figures 16 and 17 both indicate a slight deviation 
from such a theory. The data tend to fall below the theoretical curve 
and define a slightly less sharp break in the region of 0.4 second to 1.0 
second. This indicates that there were delayed neutron emitters present 
with half-lives less than 0.230 second for uranium-235 and 0.257 second 
for plutonium-239 and/or that more than one half-life in the region of 
0.2 second was present. The deviation, however, is only slightly greater 
than a standard deviation of the data, indicating that most of the 0.2 
second group is generated by precursors with half-lives near 0.23 second. 
There appears to be no statistical deviation between theory and data for 
periods between 0.1 and 0.3 second, implying no appreciable contribution 
from delayed neutron precursors with half-lives between 0.04 and 0.12 
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second and no precursors with shorter half-lives of sufficient magnitude 
to have a detectable effect at 0.1 second. 
One standard deviation of each point in the sets of data used to 
look for short half-life delayed neutron groups is about 1.0 percent. A 
discrepancy of one standard deviation at 0.1 second, corresponding to a 
delayed neutron group of 0.04 second half-life and a relative abundance 
of 0.01, should be observable as a change of slope in the 0.1 to 0.5 
second period region. A discrepancy of three standard deviations at a 
0.3 second period would affect observably the slope of the signature 
in the 0.2 to 0.7 second period region. This would correspond to a de-
layed neutron group of half-life 0.12 second and relative abundance of 
0.03. The exponential slope as a function of period for short half-life 
groups is, itself, a function of half-life. The slope for shorter half-
lives is steeper. Therefore, the sensitivity of these data to delayed 
neutron groups with half-lives less than 0.04 second decreases rapidly 
with decreasing half-life. A l a discrepancy from theory at 0.1 second 
period would imply a response three standard deviations above the ob-
served saturation level (response at 0.1 second period) at a period of 
0.06 second. This corresponds to a delayed neutron group of half-life 
0.025 second and a relative abundance of 0.03. From these data, then, 
it can be inferred that there are no delayed neutron groups with half-
lives between 0.025 second and 0.12 second with relative abundances as 
large as the smallest group relative abundance reported by Keepin. 
Errors in determining the fractions of a period that the sample 
spends in the beam, waiting, and in the detector are not particularly 
important in the signature analysis experiment because both the standards 
and the unknowns were run with the same experimental configuration and 
theoretical curves were not used to separate the signatures of uranium 
and plutonium. In looking for short half-life delayed neutrons, however, 
errors in the values of experimental parameters used to generate the theo-
retical curve could introduce discrepancies between experimental and 
theoretical curves that might give rise to the apparent existence of non-
existent delayed neutron groups. It was assumed that errors in the acti-
vation, wait, and detection fractions of a cycle, non-uniformities of the 
beam, and variations of detector geometry did not significantly affect 
experimental results. In Figures 19 and 20, the theoretical and experi-
mental points for the complete curves of delayed neutrons as a function of 
cycle time for uranium-235 and plutonium-239, respectively, indicate by 
the agreement between experimental data and theory that this is a valid 
assumption. If searching for short half-life delayed neutron groups had 
been the primary thrust of this experiment or if such groups had been 
indicated by the data the experimental parameters affecting the theoreti-
cal curves would necessarily have received more attention. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this experiment, as stated in Chapter I, was to 
show the validity of the theory developed in Chapter III with an isotopic 
analysis using cyclic activation of delayed neutrons and to evaluate the 
applicability of the method to safeguards and nuclear material control 
situations. Figures 16 to 22 all contain theoretical plots as well as 
experimental points. Agreement between experimental data, the points in 
Figures 19 and 20, and the curve resulting from using Keepin's delayed 
neutron groups and abundances in Equation (3-28) is within statistical 
deviations at most points along the curve. Discrepancies at the high 
cycle frequency knee are small and are in the direction expected con-
sidering the theoretical curve was generated with a single delayed neu-
tron half-life for each delayed group, and each group actually represents 
several delayed neutron precursors of similar, but slightly different, 
half life. Data taken at short cycle times showed no evidence of short-
half-life delayed neutron groups. The delayed neutron groups of 73.9 ms 
44 
and 4.02 ms half lives reported at VPI were, as they surmised, gamma-
induced photodisintegrations of deuterium. 
Like other non-destructive assay methods, the method of isotopic 
analysis developed in this experiment has virtues and weaknesses that 
recommend it to some accountability situations and not to others. The 
property measured by this method is a result of fission--the property of 
interest in special nuclear materials. Use of neutron interrogation and 
consequent neutron response allows assay in the presence of ambient 
gamma radiation. Results of the assay include the quantity and isotopic 
composition of the fissionable material present. On the other hand, 
this method counts delayed neutrons, which occur after a small percent-
age of fissions, so to obtain reasonable levels of accuracy, the assay 
must be done with long count times, in a high interrogation flux, and/or 
for large samples. The equations of Chapter III, however, hold for any 
interrogation source that can be pulsed, and which produces a delayed 
response. Fast or thermal neutrons could have been used to induce fis-
sions resulting in delayed neutrons. Use of thermal neutrons had the 
advantage of expedience and high reaction cross sections, and the dis-
advantage, due to the high absorption cross sections, of limited penetra-
tion in the samples. 
In the nuclear fuel cycle this assay method should find use where 
non-destructive analysis is necessary, and where there is a need to dis-
tinguish between the various fissioning isotopes as well as for measuring 
the overall quantity of fissionable material. The input and discharge of 
fuel at the reactor, and various stages of the reprocessing process, are 
logical materials to be assayed with this method. 
Fresh fuel fed to light-water reactors will normally be low enrich-
ment uranium (less than five percent enriched) or plutonium mixed with 
natural uranium. When it is necessary to identify the fissioning isotope, 
this delayed neutron assay method could find use. Fuel rods are too large 
to conveniently move into and out of a fixed neutron beam; a chopper would 
have to be used to pulse the neutron beam, keeping the sample steady or 
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moving it only slowly through the assay station. Neutron generators or 
some means of chopping a neutron source, such as californium-252, could 
be employed if sufficient flux intensities could be obtained. 
Fuel pellet diameters for light water reactors are about one cen-
timeter. This is comparable to the mean free path for thermal neutrons 
in slightly enriched fuel, so that self-shielding effects are significant. 
However, the assumption of homogeneity is warranted in fresh reactor 
fuel and the system can be calibrated with a known standard in the same 
physical form as the material to be assayed to compensate for self-
shielding. Such a calibration would also compensate for self-shielding 
of the epithermal delayed neutrons and prompt neutrons from fissions 
caused by delayed neutrons. However, these latter two effects have been 
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shown to be small and to cancel each other in samples with diameters 
similar to fuel rods. 
A light water reactor fuel rod is about four meters long and con-
tains about 130 grams of fissionable material. The error analysis in 
Chapter VI shows that a gram of uranium-235 can be assayed to a preci-
sion of two percent (one sigma) in about an hour. In an hour, 10 grams 
of uranium-235 can be assayed to a precision of about 0.6 percent. Ten 
grams of uranium-235 are contained in a segment of LWR fuel rod about 
30 cm long. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and International Atomic 
Energy Agency safeguards requirements are that the limit of error of the 
material unaccounted for (LEMUF) be not more than 0.2 percent of the 
total material balance. Ten one hour assays of 30 cm segments of fuel 
rod would have a total assayed material precision of 0.2 percent. A 
large number of rods could be counted for 10 minutes or so, each achieving 
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the same result, but the assay of each rod might not be good enough to 
detect the single out-of-specs fuel rod. Using a chopper or pulse gen-
erator to produce the required activation cycle, a rod could be moved 
slowly through an assay station while an assay was being done to assay 
the whole rod in one pass. An hour count with an assay station active 
volume containing about 30 cm of fuel rod would produce an assay with a 
precision of 0.6 percent but no information on the axial concentration 
of fissionable material. 
Plutonium bearing fuel rods could be assayed for plutonium-241 
content, and from that, an estimate of plutonium-240 made. An hour's 
assay on a 30 cm segment of fuel rod would yield plutonium-239 and 
plutonium-241 quantities with standard deviations of three percent. 
Thirty or thirty-five such measurements would be required to meet safe-
guard requirements of 0.5 percent standard deviation in the LEMUF. 
Some plutonium assay is done by calorimetry. Accurate use of 
calorimetry requires that the isotonic composition of the plutonium be 
-
known since plutonium-240 and plutonium-241 content changes the heat of 
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decay. Use of the assay method developed in this experiment to assay 
plutonium for plutonium-239 and plutonium-241 content and calculating 
plutonium-240 content from the plutonium-241 present can improve calori-
metric assay precisions. Isotopic assays with precisions of three per-
cent allow calorimetric assay for total plutonium better than 1.0 percent. 
Spent fuel assay is of interest to the reactor operator, who owns 
the plutonium and uranium in the fuel, and the reprocessor, who needs 
the assay to evaluate the operating parameters of his process, such as 
how much neutron absorber to add to prevent an accidental cricitality. 
Materials balance at the reprocessor is also important because the 
plutonium output of the plant is in a form that would be potentially 
useful to a diverter of limited sophistication. Assay of spent fuel is 
complicated by the fission product gamma-rays that accompany the fuel and 
the difficulty of obtaining representative samples from remotely operated 
dissolver tanks. 
The mean free path of thermal neutrons is similar in spent fuel to 
what it is in fresh fuel. There is less fissionable material with high 
capture cross sections, but there is some added neutron absorption by 
fission products. Thermal neutron absorption resulting in fissions is 
less in spent fuel than in fresh fuel. 
Intense gamma-ray fields are associated with spent fuel at dis-
charge from a reactor and at all early stages of reprocessing. In this 
experiment the gamma discrimination of BF_ detectors was found to be in-
sufficient to handle these fields. However, with gamma-ray shields for 
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the BF_ or He detectors and pulse rise-time discrimination it should be 
possible to assay spent fuel by delayed neutrons. 
The plutonium in spent fuel contains both plutonium-239 and -241. 
Composition for LWR discharge fuel is about 60 percent plutonium-239, 
24 percent plutonium-240, and 16 percent plutonium-241 depending on 
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burnup, reactor design, and reactor operation. The plutonium-240 con-
tributes a neutron background from spontaneous fission decay, which is 
increased further from (a,n) reactions due to transuranic elements. The 
results in Chapter VI were obtained with low neutron backgrounds; how-
ever, the effect of a large background can be considered in the error 
analysis. A neutron background equal to the count rate would increase 
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the standard deviation of the count rate by the square root of two. 
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Indications from the literature are that the neutron background from 
spent fuel is not large enough to preclude analysis by delayed neutrons. 
When plutonium-240 is present in the samples, increased interrogation 
flux is more efficient in bettering assay precision than increased sample 
size because statistics gained by more fissions in a larger sample are 
partially offset by increased plutonium spontaneous fission background. 
LWR spent fuel will contain three fissionable isotopes, uranium-
235, plutonium-239, and plutonium-241. The analysis done in Chapter VI 
was for two fissioning isotopes. To accommodate three fissioning iso-
topes a three parameter curve fitting numerical analysis could be ap-
plied to the data, or the analysis equipment could be calibrated with 
plutonium containing the approximate plutonium-239 to plutonium-241 ratios 
expected and a two parameter analysis done for uranium and total pluton-
ium. Considering only delayed neutron fractions the results in Table 8 
indicate that standard deviations of two percent for uranium-235 and 11 
percent for plutonium-239 may be obtained after one hour of counting 
with a 30 cm length of spent fuel rod containing uranium-235 and plutonium 
in about equal atom percents at one percent enrichment. Interference 
from plutonium-241 delayed neutrons--the plutonium-241 delayed neutron 
contribution makes the total plutonium response more like the response 
of uranium-235 than plutonium-239--and neutron background from plutonium-
240 spontaneous fission would increase these standard deviations. The 
IAEA requires a standard deviation of 0.8 percent for the reprocessing 
uranium material balance and 1.0 percent for plutonium. If a 30 cm 
sample of spent fuel would yield a total Pu assay with a standard devia-
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tion of 11 percent in an hour, the IAEA requirements could be met with 
100 samples. The spent fuel from an HTGR contains uranium-233 and 
uranium-235, which have delayed neutron signatures that are more separable 
than the signatures of uranium-235 and plutonium-240. HTGR fuel must be 
crushed and burned to get the fissionable material out of the carbon and 
silicon carbide microspheres and precision is lost in these processes. 
A non-destructive assay using the method developed here could make an 
assay on HTGR fuel as well as current wet chemical and mass spectrographic 
methods, with one to five percent accuracy, in less time and at less 
cost. 
The objectives of this project were to develop an assay method 
based on cyclic activation of delayed neutrons and to assess its appli-
cability to assay of nuclear materials. The equations developed in 
Chapter III describe a cyclic activation technique that is useful in 
activation analysis situations beyond those explored in these experi-
ments. The shape of the activation response as a function of activation 
cycle frequency can be used to determine half lives and abundances of 
activation products. Activation cycle frequencies can be predicted from 
Chapter III equations to enhance or discriminate against certain half 
lives in a gamma-ray spectrum analysis. 
Testing of the assay method was done with the experiments con-
ducted in the GTRR thermal neutron beam from H-l. These experiments 
indicated that the equations of Chapter III did predict the response to 
cyclic activation adequately and that a useful assay of nuclear fuel can 
be obtained from differences in delayed neutron group abundances and 
half lives. The assay method developed here is not superior to currently 
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available methods for total fissile material assay — counting at only 
very short cycle time is comparable to other delayed neutron assay 
methods; but for isotopic assay of fissile materials there do not seem 
to be other non-destructive methods available that are more precise. 
The method developed here seems to be most suitable for the isotopic 
assay of fresh and spent reactor fuel, where its non-destructive nature 
and potential resistance to fission product gamma-rays are a significant 
advantage. Count times may be too long to consider seriously 100 percent 
throughput for fresh or spent fuel from a reactor, but current safe-
guard regulations can be met with less sampling problems than would be 
encountered with wet chemical or mass spectrographic analysis. A sig-
nificant disadvantage of the method is the need for a strong source of 
thermal neutrons. However, the equations developed in Chapter III hold 
for a pulsed neutron generator or chopped isotopic neutron source as 
well as for cyclic activation in a reactor beam, if the source is suffi-
ciently strong to produce enough delayed neutrons for good statistics. 
A reactor neutron beam may well be made available at the power plant 
where the fuel is used if such a feature is incorporated into the plant 
design. 
The programs written for these experiments handle only two fission-
ing isotopes. This is sufficient for the assay of HTGR fuel, uranium-
233 and uranium-235, or the isotopic assay of plutonium, plutonium-239 
and plutonium-241. To establish this assay method as a useful tool in the 
assay of LWR spent fuel the effect of plutonium-241 on the assay of 
plutonium-239 and uranium-235 will have to be investigated. Further work 
should also be done to determine the practicality of using a pulsed 
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neutron source or a chopped-beam isotopic source to make the assay 
equipment more portable. 
APPENDIX A 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BF NEUTRON DETECTORS 
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APPENDIX B 
FLOW CHART FOR THE DATA ANALYSIS 
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